1994
DOI: 10.1002/smj.4250150909
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The Costs and Benefits of Managerial Incentives and Monitoring in Large U.S. Corporations: When is More not Better?

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Cited by 473 publications
(386 citation statements)
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References 47 publications
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“…With increasing attention of the board's members, there is an increasing need for top managers to defend strategic decisions and moves through proposals to the board (Castaner and Kavadis 2013). Indeed, the vigilance of a board tends to increase when there is a higher percentage of external directors (Lim 2015), the CEO does not chair the board (Finkelstein and D'Aveni 1994;Kesner and Johnson 1990), the CEO does not appoint board members (Zajac and Westphal 1994), and ownership is very concentrated (Castaner and Kavadis 2013). In addition, top decision makers' task demands tend to increase when they are facing activist shareholders (Walls et al 2012).…”
Section: Managers' Task Demands and Top-down Attention Allocationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…With increasing attention of the board's members, there is an increasing need for top managers to defend strategic decisions and moves through proposals to the board (Castaner and Kavadis 2013). Indeed, the vigilance of a board tends to increase when there is a higher percentage of external directors (Lim 2015), the CEO does not chair the board (Finkelstein and D'Aveni 1994;Kesner and Johnson 1990), the CEO does not appoint board members (Zajac and Westphal 1994), and ownership is very concentrated (Castaner and Kavadis 2013). In addition, top decision makers' task demands tend to increase when they are facing activist shareholders (Walls et al 2012).…”
Section: Managers' Task Demands and Top-down Attention Allocationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…For example, it was alleged that TCE discourages alternative social controls in favor of "rational" controls that are "bad for practice" (Ghoshal & Moran 1996, p. 24); that TCE oversimplifies complex phenomena (Perrow 1986, p. 236); that agency theory often fails to predict corporate performance because of its excessive emphasis on self-interested mechanisms of monitoring, independence, and incentives (Dalton et al 2003;Dalton et al 1999;Westphal 1999;Zajac & Westphal 1994); that theories of organizational economics neglect historical realities of culture and local morality (Guillen 2001); and that adopting a traditional view of the corporation in which shareholders are the sole residual claimants misses the underlying reality of economic value creation and the distribution of value to stakeholders (Asher et al 2005;Coff 1999;Zingales 2000).…”
Section: The Values Quandarymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Control is fundamental for general organizational success (Cyert & March, 1963;Johnson, Cullen, Sakano, & Bronson, 2001;Kumar & Seth, 1998), and is a particularly important issue for MNCs given the complexity of their operations (Beamish & Banks 1987;Dunning 1979;Hennart 1982;McManus 1972), and the challenge of maintaining strategic control over foreign subsidiaries (Gatignon & Anderson, 1988;Liu, Vredenburg, & Steel, 2014). Control is needed to exert influence over local boards (Zajac & Westphal, 1994), obtain or access information, monitor managerial performance, and undertake strategic reforms in corporate organization or operations. Control can minimize the likelihood of a partner's opportunistic behaviour, and can mitigate the consequences of such behaviour by preserving an administrative fiat (White & Lui, 2005;Williamson, 1985).…”
Section: Literature Review and Propositionsmentioning
confidence: 99%