2014 IEEE Military Communications Conference 2014
DOI: 10.1109/milcom.2014.26
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The Coordination of Cyber and Kinetic Deception for Operational Effect: Attacking the C4ISR Interface

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Cited by 6 publications
(3 citation statements)
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“…The only cyber vigilance tasks documented in the literature to date are owned by The United States Air Force and are outdated simulations of the demands associated with modern network defense (McIntire et al, 2013 ; Mancuso et al, 2015 ; Sawyer et al, 2016 ). Beyond researchers, an accessible experimental test bed for human-in-the-loop studies of cyber vigilance decrement could also provide utility to business, government, and militaries, by informing training, selection, and software development standards (Alhawari et al, 2012 ; Ormrod, 2014 ).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…The only cyber vigilance tasks documented in the literature to date are owned by The United States Air Force and are outdated simulations of the demands associated with modern network defense (McIntire et al, 2013 ; Mancuso et al, 2015 ; Sawyer et al, 2016 ). Beyond researchers, an accessible experimental test bed for human-in-the-loop studies of cyber vigilance decrement could also provide utility to business, government, and militaries, by informing training, selection, and software development standards (Alhawari et al, 2012 ; Ormrod, 2014 ).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Lapses in network defender attention therefore have the potential to cripple the cyber infrastructure being guarded (Thomason, 2013 ; Cavelty, 2014 ). This includes virtual and physical military assets, governmental assets, central banking networks, stock market infrastructure as well as national power and telecommunications grids (Gordon et al, 2011 ; Jolley, 2012 ; Saltzman, 2013 ; Ormrod, 2014 ; Hicks, 2015 ; Skopik et al, 2016 ; Rajan et al, 2017 ). The integrity of these assets hinges on measuring and mitigating neurocognitive inefficiencies in network defenders' capacity to sustain vigilant attention to cyber security command and control consoles (Maybury, 2012 ).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Lessons learned through human factors research conducted with the WACDT could significantly enhance the protective capacity of network defense analysts defending critical cyber infrastructures (Maybury, 2012 ). For example, increasing reliance on global cyber infrastructures encompasses virtual and physical assets associated with the military, government, central banking, power distribution, and telecommunications (Gordon et al, 2011 ; Jolley, 2012 ; Saltzman, 2013 ; Ormrod, 2014 ; Hicks, 2015 ; Skopik et al, 2016 ; Rajan et al, 2017 ). The more cyber infrastructures are relied on, the greater the impact of their compromise (Ben-Asher and Gonzalez, 2015 ; Goutam, 2015 ).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%