The Cooperative Stability Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Military‐Civilian Collaborative Innovation for China’s Satellite Industry

Dai

et al. 2020

Complexity

In view of the particularity and high risk of coal mining industry, the decision-making behavior of multiple agents inside the coal-mine enterprise plays a very important role in ensuring the safety and sustainable development of coal mining industry. The existing literature studies on coal-mine safety production focus mainly on statically analyzing the game among the external entities such as the government, the enterprises themselves, and the employees inside the enterprise from a macro perspective,are short of research on revealing the dynamic interactions among the actors directly involved in the coal-mine accidents and also on proposals for effective interactions that will lead to improved safety outcomes. Therefore, this paper explores the use of evolutionary game theory to describe the interactions among the stakeholders in China’s coal-mine safety production system, which includes the organization, the first-line miners, and the first-line managers. Moreover, the paper also explores dynamic simulations of the evolutionary game model to analyze the stability of stakeholder interactions and to identify equilibrium solutions. The simulation results show that when certain conditions are met, the decision-making behavior of the organization, miners, and managers can evolve into the unique ideal steady state (1, 1, 1). In addition, the strategy portfolio with a relatively high initial proportion of three agents converges more quickly to an ideal state than a relatively low strategy portfolio. Moreover, the stable state and equilibrium values are not affected by the initial value changes. Finally, we find that the combination of positive incentive policies and strict penalties policies can make the evolutionary game system converge to desired stability faster. The application of the evolutionary game and numerical simulation when simulating the multiplayer game process of coal-mine safety production is an effective way, which provides a more effective solution to the safety and sustainable development of coal mining industry.

Section: Simulation Analysis Of the Evolutionary Game Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Game Modelling and Strategy Research on Trilateral Evolution for Coal-Mine Operational Safety Production System: A Simulation Approach

Dai

et al. 2020

Complexity

“…Now, more scholars are engaged in innovative research on CMI. Based on evolutionary game theory, Fang et al [57] established an evolutionary game model of military-civilian collaborative innovation in China's satellite industry, with military and private enterprises as the main participants under bounded rationality, and summarized the factors affecting collaborative stability. Du et al [58] believe that China's innovation-driven system should be constructed from three aspects-innovation elements, structural systems and innovation environments-which can provide guarantees for the effective implementation of the innovation-driven mechanism of CMI.…”

Section: Civil-military Integrationmentioning

confidence: 99%

An Evaluation Study of the Capabilities of Civilian Manufacturing Enterprises Entering the Military Products Market under the Background of China’s Civil–Military Integration

2020

Sustainability

As the Chinese government has clearly put forward the development of civil-military integration (CMI) as a national strategy, civilian manufacturing enterprises entering the military products market (CMEE-MPM) can effectively improve China's national defense science and technology capabilities and can also be an effective way for enterprises to enhance their sustainable development capabilities. However, due to the high standards and strict requirements of the national defense industry for supplier review, civilian manufacturing enterprises must evaluate their CMEE-MPM capabilities. In this study, a new evaluation and consideration model is proposed. Enterprises that plan to enter the military product market can use this model to evaluate their own CMEE-MPM capabilities. The evaluation model framework is composed of three successive parts: constructing an evaluation indicator system according to experts and enterprise experiences, calculating the weight of the indicators using an analytical hierarchy process (AHP), and evaluating CMEE-MPM capabilities using the method of fuzzy comprehensive evaluation. Finally, this study verifies the feasibility of the application of the above model by measuring the capabilities of a civilian manufacturing enterprise that wants to enter the military products market in Harbin, China. The results show that the indicator system constructed in this paper can effectively evaluate CMEE-MPM capabilities. The findings of this research can be used as a reference for the decision making of civilian manufacturing enterprises regarding whether or not to enter the military products market, and then promote the sustainable development of enterprises.

“…Zhao et al [29] employed evolutionary game theory to study government guidance between the military enterprises and private enterprises in the CMI. Wei and Chan [30] constructed an evolutionary game model to test the cooperative stability of Military-Civilian collaborative innovation in China's satellite industry. Liang et al [8] analyzed the technology transfer in the military-civil system with the evolutionary game theory based on the complex network.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolutionary Game of the Civil-Military Integration With Financial Support

Yang

2020

IEEE Access

How to provide financial support efficiently is becoming an essential way for military enterprises to take the strategy of Civil-Military Integration (CMI) in China. In this paper, we used the evolutionary game theory to build a model for military enterprises to choose the approach of the CMI with financial support. After derivation and simulation of the model, the results showed that the profit and cost from the CMI or the financial support changes could cause the different evolutionary stable states (ESS). Setting the financial support degree in a relevant range could encourage firms to participate in the CMI and reduce the spillover. Besides, the initial proportion of military enterprises that choose the CMI could affect and predict the trend of future development, which provides a reference for policy-makers.