The Context Sensitivity of Knowledge Ascriptions

Kompa, Nikola

doi:10.1163/18756735-90000772

Cited by 45 publications

(10 citation statements)

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“…Cf. Kompa (2002) for an earlier example of a similar view, though one which might be aligned more closely with non-indexical contextualism. I am focusing on MacFarlane's presentation of the view here as it has been developed in the most detail (e.g., 2005, 2009 and 2014) and has generated the most discussion.…”

Section: New Epistemic Relativismmentioning

confidence: 98%

Epistemological Implications of Relativism

Carter¹

2017

The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Contextualism

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Relativists about knowledge ascriptions think that whether a particular use of a knowledge-ascribing sentence, e.g., "Keith knows that the bank is open" is true depends on the epistemic standards at play in the assessor's context-viz., the context in which the knowledge ascription is being assessed for truth or falsity. Given that the very same knowledge-ascription can be assessed for truth or falsity from indefinitely many perspectives, relativism has a striking consequence. When I ascribe knowledge to someone (e.g., when I say that, at a particular time, "Keith knows that the bank is open"), what I've said does not get a truth-value absolutely, but only relatively. If this semantic thesis about the word "knows" and its cognates is true, what implications would this have for epistemology, the philosophical theory of knowledge? The present aim will be to engage with this mostly unexplored question, and then to consider how the epistemological conclusions drawn might bear on the plausibility of a relativist semantics for "knows".

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Section: New Epistemic Relativismmentioning

confidence: 98%

Epistemological Implications of Relativism

Carter¹

2017

The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Contextualism

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“…Another reaction to contextualism was relativism, which holds that the truth value of a knowledge ascription does not depend, or, at least, does not only depend on the context of ascription and the subject's interests, but (also) on the context from which the ascription is being evaluated, or assessed, for its truth value. Because the literature on this topic is very vast, the proposed references will be easily found wanting, but nevertheless: for skeptical invariantism, see Unger 1979; for moderate insensitive invariantism, see Williamson 2000, 2005; for subject‐sensitive invariantism, see Hawthorne 2004; Stanley 2005; for contextualism, see DeRose 1992; Lewis 1996; Rysiew 2001; Kompa 2003; Lawlor 2005; Blome‐Tillmann 2006; and articles in Preyer and Peter 2005: 12–130, covering both sides of the debate; for relativism, see MacFarlane 2005; for the specific case of self ‐ ascriptions of knowledge, see Bonnay and Egré 2008.…”

Section: The Scope Of the Debatementioning

confidence: 99%

The Scope and the Subtleties of the Contextualism–Literalism–Relativism Debate

Stojanovic

2008

Language and Linguist. Compass

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In recent years, a number of new trends have seen light at the intersection of semantics and philosophy of language. They are meant to address puzzles raised by the context-sensitivity of a variety of natural language constructions, such as knowledge ascriptions, belief reports, epistemic modals, indicative conditionals, quantifier phrases, gradable adjectives, temporal constructions, vague predicates, moral predicates, predicates of personal taste. A diversity of labels have consequently emerged, such as 'contextualism', 'indexicalism', 'invariantism', 'literalism', 'minimalism', and 'relativism', variously qualified. The goal of this essay is to pinpoint the issues that lie at the heart of the recent debates, clarify what is at stake, and provide a snapshot of the current theoretical landscape.1172 Isidora Stojanovic

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“…5). For two other defenses of a relativist semantics for knowledge-attributions, seeRichard (2004) andKompa (2002). Kompa's view, however, might be best classified not as relativism but as non-indexical contextualism.…”

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confidence: 99%