“…Hayek is a defender of subjectivism but his individualism, similarly to his liberalism, is of bizarre sort. His causal theory of mind is incapable of explaining consciousness, intentionality, inference, or the descriptive and argumentative functions of language (Feser, 2011;Forsyth, 1988;Popper, 1953;Smith, 1997) One cannot help but wonder as to whether writers who fail to acknowledge this similarity, or argue that this relational view of things constitutes a novel and superior feature of Hayek's theory in contradistinction to Mach, have actually paid any serious attention to the latter's work. Birner (1996), for example, posits that 'one of the great differences' between Hayek's and Mach's psychology constitutes in the former's discovery (Hayek, 1952, 53) In actuality, the idea that the mental and physical order can be defined in terms of the relations between their elements, which plays such a prominent role in Hayek's theoretical system, builds upon an unmistakably Machian foundation.…”