The Conditional Fallacy in Contemporary Philosophy

Shope, Robert K.

doi:10.2307/2025564

Cited by 190 publications

(43 citation statements)

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“…11 Hornsby (2008, § 1.1), Parfit (20012011: 35), Schroeder (2007: 14-15;2008: 67;2009: 233) and Way (2009: 3-4) advance (C), or something very similar to it. Some (e.g., Shope 1978) are suspicious of any analysis formulated using a subjunctive conditional. My case against (C) and its descendant might provide support for such suspicion.…”

Section: Counterfactual Analyses Of Subjective Reasonsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Keep Things in Perspective

Whiting

2017

JESP

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Objective reasons are given by the facts. Subjective reasons are given by one’s perspective on the facts. Subjective reasons, not objective reasons, determine what it is rational to do. In this paper, I argue against a prominent account of subjective reasons. The problem with that account, I suggest, is that it makes what one has subjective reason to do, and hence what it is rational to do, turn on matters outside or independent of one’s perspective. After explaining and establishing this point, I offer a novel account of subjective reasons that avoids the problem.

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Section: Counterfactual Analyses Of Subjective Reasonsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Keep Things in Perspective

Whiting

2017

JESP

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“…15 15 It might be thought that the subjunctive conditional here is problematic. After all, as Robert Shope [1978] has argued at length, biconditionals featuring a subjunctive are prone to what he calls "the conditional fallacy". In the simplest case, the biconditional is of the form 'p ↔ (q r)'.…”

Section: Outright Understandingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Understanding phenomena

Kelp

2015

Synthese

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The literature on the nature of understanding can be divided into two broad camps. Explanationists believe that it is knowledge of explanations that is key to understanding. In contrast, their manipulationist rivals maintain that understanding essentially involves an ability to manipulate certain representations. The aim of this paper is to provide a novel knowledge based account of understanding. More specifically, it proposes an account of maximal understanding of a given phenomenon in terms of fully comprehensive and maximally well-connected knowledge of it and of degrees of understanding in terms of approximations to such knowledge. It is completed by a contextualist semantics for outright attributions of understanding according to which an attribution of understanding is true of one just in case one knows enough about it to perform some contextually determined task. It is argued that this account has an edge over both its explanationist and manipulationist competitors.

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“…As for the most of us, the proposition I have 10 millions is not part of a suitable structure of reasons, so that you are not in the right track, or in the right epistemic position regarding I have 10 millions. Nevertheless, it's the existence of a non trivial property of being a reason what makes rational for formulation could suffer from what has been called a "conditional fallacy" (Shope 1978). Such a fallacy seems to threat any use of subjunctive conditionals, perhaps with stronger consequences for internalism (Johnson 1999).…”

Section: Manuscritomentioning

confidence: 99%

Propositional Justification and Infinitism

Flores

2017

Manuscrito

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This essay presents the chief reasons for making a distinction between propositional and doxastic justification and, also, points out two things: (1) no theory of propositional justification implies a theory of doxastic justification; (2) infinitism is, essentially, a theory of propositional justification. Additionally, this paper tries to shed some light on the three conjointly sufficient conditions for a proper infinitist view of propositional justification.--

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The Conditional Fallacy in Contemporary Philosophy

Cited by 190 publications

References 0 publications

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Understanding phenomena

Propositional Justification and Infinitism

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