Keep Things in Perspective

Whiting, Daniel

doi:10.26556/jesp.v8i1.77

Cited by 25 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 29 publications

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“…The second background principle driving D3 is the thesis that, in order for a fact p to provide one with (some, sufficient, decisive) reason to Φ, one must have the ability to Φ (Sylvan 2015(Sylvan , 2018 or know how to Φ (Lord 2018: Ch.4). To deny this is to affirm the idea that one can have (some, sufficient, decisive) reason to Φ even though one is unable to or doesn't know 8 Broad factualism is a prominent position in the literature on the normativity of action (Alvarez 2010, Dancy 2000, Kiesewetter 2017, Parfit 2011, Raz 1999, Scanlon 1998, Schroeder 2007, Skorupski 2011, Thomson 2008, and Whiting 2014 and the normativity of belief (Kiesewetter 2017;Littlejohn 2017;Lord 2018;Schroeder 2015;Sylvan 2015Sylvan , 2016Sylvan , 2018and Whiting 2014). how to Φ.…”

Section: D2 Ignorance Excludes Reasons-responsivenessmentioning

confidence: 99%

Ignorance and awareness

Silva

Siscoe

2023

Nous

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Knowledge implies the presence of a positive relation between a person and a fact. Factual ignorance, on the other hand, implies the absence of some positive relation between a person and a fact. The two most influential views of ignorance hold that what is lacking in cases of factual ignorance is knowledge or true belief, but these accounts fail to explain a number of basic facts about ignorance. In their place, we propose a novel and systematic defense of the view that factual ignorance is the absence of awareness, an account that both comes apart from the dominant views and overcomes their deficiencies. Given the important role that ignorance plays in moral and legal theory and our understanding of various epistemic injustices, a precise and theoretically unproblematic account of the nature of ignorance is important not only for normative epistemology, but also for law, ethics, and applied epistemology.

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Section: D2 Ignorance Excludes Reasons-responsivenessmentioning

confidence: 99%

Ignorance and awareness

Silva

Siscoe

2023

Nous

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“…3 So for instance you could have a subjective normative reason to drink any nearby gin and even a subjective normative reason to drink the petrol, because you justifiably believe it is gin. 4 From here on out, I will talk just of objective and subjective reasons, but I will be discussing normative reasons, which are the reasons which describe what it is rational for us to do, rather than motivating reasons (the reasons on which we act) or any other sorts of reasons (Whiting 2014).…”

Section: The Epistemic Account Of the Normativity Of Requestsmentioning

confidence: 99%

What Makes Requests Normative? The Epistemic Account Defended

Weltman

2023

Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy

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This paper defends the epistemic account of the normativity of requests. The epistemic account says that a request does not create any reasons and thus does not have any special normative power. Rather, a request gives reasons by revealing information which is normatively relevant. I argue that compared to competing accounts of request normativity, especially those of David Enoch and James H.P. Lewis, the epistemic account gives better answers to cases of insincere requests, is simpler, and does a better job incorporating the importance of relationships. I also defend the epistemic account from three objections: that requests are important because they constitute consent, that requests and wishes must be normatively different, and that some requests do not provide any new information.

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“…70 For this line of criticism, see Kiesewetter,The Normativity of Rationality,[31][32][33] beliefs are themselves rational (of course, this makes the view unsatisfactory as a reductive account of rationality, but this is not Whiting's goal). 71 An alternative strategy is to characterize the idea of apparent reason in terms of the notion of competence, which would be taken as more basic. On Sylvan's view, some consideration is an apparent reason for an agent if she is in a position to competently treat it as a reason.72 In turn, competence in treating considerations as reasons can be understood as a reliable disposition to be guided only by normative reasons, or by reference to the way in which some virtuous or ideal agent would be disposed to respond.73 An agent that recklessly holds the belief that p against all available evidence will not be competently treating p as a reason (her holding that belief would manifest a very unreliable disposition to be guided only by reasons), so p would not be among her apparent reasons and would not make the agent's behavior rational.…”

Section: Rationality and Apparent Reasonsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Rationality, Appearances, and Apparent Facts

Salas

2018

JESP

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Ascriptions of rationality are related to our practices of praising and criticizing. This seems to provide motivation for normative accounts of rationality, more specifically for the view that rationality is a matter of responding to normative reasons. However, rational agents are sometimes guided by false beliefs. This is problematic for those reasons-based accounts of rationality that are also committed to the widespread thesis that normative reasons are facts. The critical aim of the paper is to present objections to recent proposed solutions to this problem, according to which the responses of deceived agents would be rationalized by facts about how things appear to them. My positive aim is to argue that accounts of reasons in terms of apparent reasons manage to capture the intuitions that seem to favor a normative account of rationality (more specifically, they capture the connection between attributions of rationality and praise and criticism).

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Keep Things in Perspective

Cited by 25 publications

References 29 publications

Ignorance and awareness

Ignorance and awareness

What Makes Requests Normative? The Epistemic Account Defended

Rationality, Appearances, and Apparent Facts

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