The Concept of the Self in Psychoanalytic Theory and its Philosophical Foundations

Abstract

Concepts of "the self" in psychoanalytic theory have important philosophic underpinnings which may not be adequately appreciated. Both self psychology and ego psychology, with their contrasting positions on the self as a mental structure, retrace paths taken by Western philosophy beginning at least with Hume and Descartes. They reflect traditional philosophic questions, notably of a homuncular self internal to consciousness and the isolation of the subject from other selves. Psychoanalysis has not utilized Hegel's conception of the intersubjective origins of the self, in which the self emerges only in an encounter with another subject, although this approach is implicit in the work of Winnicott on the mother-infant dyad. This movement from a one- to a two-person psychology also presents conceptual problems, as illustrated by the psychoanalytic theories of Sartre and Lacan, who take up opposing positions on the status of consciousness and on intersubjectivity in the formation of the self. Sartre's phenomenology, with its emphasis on the questing nature of the subject in search of an identity, resonates with contemporary theories of narcissism in which the painful isolation of self from self-affirming and mirroring objects is central to clinical practice. Lacan's insight into the role of acquisition of language helps us to understand the formation of the subject in pursuit of a virtual selfhood, as Sartre described, but embedded within an intersubjective matrix.

The Multifaceted Nature of Self-Consciousness: Conceptualization, Measurement, and Consequences

“…One basic premise of both traditional and modern psychoanalytical theories refers to the conceptualization of the self as a complex and multidimensional concept. Kirshner, for example, conceived the self as an entity which reflects the average of various mental states of tension and relief [33]. Similarly, Eisnitz [34] emphasized the Gestalt emerging from the variety of self-representations which forms the basis for self-perception, whereas Kernberg [35] defined the self as an integrative structure comprised of cognitive and emotional elements, and Horney [36] described three features of the self, namely, the Actual Self, the Real Self, and the Ideal Self.…”

What Do Patients Want?: Personal Disclosure and the Intersubjective Perspective

“…A thorough review of the way that philosophy underpins intersubjectivity in psychoanalysis, and differing philosophers' approaches to the question of self consciousness is not within the scope of this paper (see , Frie 1997;Frie and Reis 2001;Kirshner 1991;Teicholz 2001). For our purposes, suffice it to say that some schools of psychoanalytic thought assert an innate capacity for recognizing the self in the mirror, a pre-reflective state (i.e., Dunn 1995;Lacan 1977).…”

In pursuit of the muse: lessons learned from martial arts Zen brushings and psychoanalysis

“…In a very touching description of the mourning process that we went through when his loved dog died, Wheelis brought to mind his message, if one could say it that way, that is what keeps life worth living are object relationships. This practice suggest's Kirshner's (1991) defi nition of the self as the emotional and intellectual expression of an experience of otherness in the present, a dynamic ever-evolving description (Figure 7). I realize that seeking security through attachments to people or things leads to a fundamental self-deception that needs to be addressed in analytic treatment.…”