The Cognitive Structure of Scientific Revolutions

Andersen, Hanne; Barker, Peter; Chen, Xiang

doi:10.1017/cbo9780511498404

Cited by 105 publications

(38 citation statements)

References 197 publications

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“…natural selection, genetic drift, Mendelian inheritance), and its empirical findings, remain important; in this respect, the EES requires no 'revolution'. In fact, modern thinking in philosophy of science challenges the hypothesis that scientific change occurs through a single kind of revolution [1,142]. Nevertheless, our analysis suggests that the EES is more than simply an extension of 'business as usual' science: it requires conceptual change [15].…”

Section: Novel Predictions Made and New Research Stimulated By The mentioning

confidence: 72%

The extended evolutionary synthesis: its structure, assumptions and predictions

et al. 2015

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Scientific activities take place within the structured sets of ideas and assumptions that define a field and its practices. The conceptual framework of evolutionary biology emerged with the Modern Synthesis in the early twentieth century and has since expanded into a highly successful research program to explore the processes of diversification and adaptation. Nonetheless, the ability of that framework satisfactorily to accommodate the rapid advances in developmental biology, genomics and ecology has been questioned. We review some of these arguments, focusing on literatures (evo-devo, developmental plasticity, inclusive inheritance and niche construction) whose implications for evolution can be interpreted in two ways-one that preserves the internal structure of contemporary evolutionary theory and one that points towards an alternative conceptual framework. The latter, which we label the 'extended evolutionary synthesis' (EES), retains the fundaments of evolutionary theory, but differs in its emphasis on the role of constructive processes in development and evolution, and reciprocal portrayals of causation. In the EES, developmental processes, operating through developmental bias, inclusive inheritance and niche construction, share responsibility for the direction and rate of evolution, the origin of character variation and organism-environment complementarity. We spell out the structure, core assumptions and novel predictions of the EES, and show how it can be deployed to stimulate and advance research in those fields that study or use evolutionary biology.

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Section: Novel Predictions Made and New Research Stimulated By The mentioning

confidence: 72%

The extended evolutionary synthesis: its structure, assumptions and predictions

et al. 2015

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“…Sin embargo, algo que los relativistas usualmente pasan por alto en sus lecturas de Kuhn (1977) es que dicho autor no consideró los paradigmas como totalmente inconmensurables al punto de imposibilitar la comunicación entre los partidarios de paradigmas rivales (Andersen, Barker, & Chen, 2006). Y es aquí donde cobra interés la idea de marcos conceptuales de distinto nivel.…”

Section: Relativismo Conceptualunclassified

Optimismo epistémico: en defensa de la objetividad en la ciencia

Bueno-Cuadra

Robles

2017

Liberabit

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“…Motivated by the work of Kuhn (esp. Kuhn 1974), certain applications to the history of science have been put forward and it has been argued that dynamic frames are a useful tool to account for scientific revolutions and conceptual frame incommensurability (Andersen et al 2006).…”

Section: Dynamic Framesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Induction from a Single Instance: Incomplete Frames

Urbaniak

Putte

2012

Found Sci

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In this paper we argue that an existing theory of concepts called dynamic frame theory, although not developed with that purpose in mind, allows for the precise formulation of a number of problems associated with induction from a single instance. A key role is played by the distinction we introduce between complete and incomplete dynamic frames, for incomplete frames seem to be very elegant candidates for the format of the background knowledge used in induction from a single instance. Furthermore, we show how dynamic frame theory provides the terminology to discuss the justification and the fallibility of incomplete frames. In the Appendix, we give a formal account of incomplete frames and the way these lead to induction from a single instance.

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The Cognitive Structure of Scientific Revolutions

Cited by 105 publications

References 197 publications

The extended evolutionary synthesis: its structure, assumptions and predictions

The extended evolutionary synthesis: its structure, assumptions and predictions

Optimismo epistémico: en defensa de la objetividad en la ciencia

Induction from a Single Instance: Incomplete Frames

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