The Cognitive Structure of Scientific Revolutions

Andersen, Hanne; Barker, Peter; Chen, Xiang

doi:10.1017/cbo9780511498404.001

Cited by 14 publications

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“…In the frame model for BIRD for example, if the attribute COLOR varied over time it might change one subconcept to another. Obviously this is a very simple model; real birds do vary in color with the season, however the point remains that for a very large class of concepts, and for most of the studies of concepts that the frame model developed from, the values of attributes were taken as Barker 2006). However, if we follow the historical development of the astronomical concept PATH we find both a major incommensurability and the abandonment of object concepts, both in the work of Johannes Kepler.…”

Section: The Copernican Revolution and Conceptual Revolutionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Cognitive Structure of Scientific Revolutions

Barker

2011

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For historical epistemology to succeed, it must adopt a defensible set of categories to characterise scientific activity over time. In historically orientated philosophy of science during the twentieth century, the original categories of theory and observation were supplemented or replaced by categories like paradigm, research program and research tradition. Underlying all three proposals was talk about conceptual systems and conceptual structures, attributed to individual scientists or to research communities, however there has been little general agreement on the nature of these structures. Recent experimental research in cognitive science has considerably refined the theory of concepts. Drawing upon the results of that research, philosophers can construct more concrete and empirically defensible representations of conceptual systems. I will suggest that this research supports a modest and useful sense of both normal and revolutionary science, not as epistemological continuities or discontinuities, but as particular patterns of conceptual change.

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Section: The Copernican Revolution and Conceptual Revolutionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Cognitive Structure of Scientific Revolutions

Barker

2011

Erkenn

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“…He provides a summary and a couple of case studies from his recent book, The Cognitive Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Andersen et al 2006). This book presents a way of modeling scientific change by means of psychological accounts of concepts and conceptual change (specifically, Barsalou's theory of frames), here illustrated by case studies as different as nuclear fission and the Copernican revolution.…”

Section: Dynamics Of Long-term Scientific Developmentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

What (Good) is Historical Epistemology? Editors’ Introduction

Feest

Sturm

2011

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We provide an overview of three ways in which the expression ''Historical epistemology'' (HE) is often understood: (1) HE as a study of the history of higher-order epistemic concepts such as objectivity, observation, experimentation, or probability; (2) HE as a study of the historical trajectories of the objects of research, such as the electron, DNA, or phlogiston; (3) HE as the long-term study of scientific developments. After laying out various ways in which these agendas touch on current debates within both epistemology and philosophy of science (e.g., skepticism, realism, rationality of scientific change), we conclude by highlighting three topics as especially worthy of further philosophical investigation. The first concerns the methods, aims and systematic ambitions of the history of epistemology. The second concerns the ways in versions of HE can be connected to versions of naturalized and social epistemologies. The third concerns the philosophy of history, and in particular the level of analysis at which a historical analysis should aim.

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“…In the philosophy of science frames are used to reconstruct different kinds of scientific concepts and conceptual change (Andersen and Nersessian 2000;Chen and Barker 2000;Chen 2003; Barker et al 2003;Andersen et al 2006;Schurz 2012, 2014). Notably, frames are used to analyse Thomas Kuhn's theory of concepts and revolutionary concept change.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Beside the representation of prototype concepts, frames are often used to represent family resemblance concepts in order to reconstruct incommensurability and conceptual change in scientific revolutions (cf Andersen et al 1996Andersen et al , 2006Chen et al 1998)…”

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A frame-based approach for theoretical concepts

Kornmesser

2015

Synthese

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According to a seminal paper by Barsalou (Frames, fields, and contrasts, 1992), frames are attribute-value-matrices for representing exemplars or concepts. Frames have been used as a tool for reconstructing scientific concepts as well as conceptual change within scientific revolutions (Andersen and Nersessian, in Philos Andersen et al., in The cognitive structure of scientific revolutions, 2006; Votsis and Schurz, in Stud Hist Philos Sci 43:105-114, 2012, in Concept types and frames. Application in language, cognition, and science, 2014). In the frame-based representations of scientific concepts developed so far the semantic content of concepts is (partially) determined by a set of attribute-specific values. This way of representing semantic content works best for prototype concepts and defined concepts of a conceptual taxonomy satisfying the no-overlap principle. In addition to the semantic content of prototype concepts and defined concepts, frames can also contain empirical knowledge that is represented as constraints between the values of the frame. Beside prototype concepts and defined concepts, theoretical concepts that are multiply operationalized play an important role in science. However, so far no frame-based representation of theoretical concepts has been proposed. In this paper, it will be shown that theoretical concepts can be represented by frames and that frame-based representations of prototype concepts and defined concepts have another structure than frame-based representations of theoretical concepts. In order to explicate this difference, we will develop a frame-based method for representing all three kinds of concepts by means of mathematical graph-theory. One important consequence will be that the constraints of a frame representing a B Stephan Kornmesser

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The Cognitive Structure of Scientific Revolutions

Cited by 14 publications

References 0 publications

The Cognitive Structure of Scientific Revolutions

The Cognitive Structure of Scientific Revolutions

What (Good) is Historical Epistemology? Editors’ Introduction

A frame-based approach for theoretical concepts

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