The Cognitive Structure of Scientific Revolutions

Abstract

For historical epistemology to succeed, it must adopt a defensible set of categories to characterise scientific activity over time. In historically orientated philosophy of science during the twentieth century, the original categories of theory and observation were supplemented or replaced by categories like paradigm, research program and research tradition. Underlying all three proposals was talk about conceptual systems and conceptual structures, attributed to individual scientists or to research communities, however there has been little general agreement on the nature of these structures. Recent experimental research in cognitive science has considerably refined the theory of concepts. Drawing upon the results of that research, philosophers can construct more concrete and empirically defensible representations of conceptual systems. I will suggest that this research supports a modest and useful sense of both normal and revolutionary science, not as epistemological continuities or discontinuities, but as particular patterns of conceptual change.

Isaac Asimov’s sci-fi novella “Profession” versus professionalism: Reflections on the (missing) scientific revolutions in the 21th century

“…So, one can attempt to synthesize them in a derivative conjecture about the end of the epoch and history of scientific revolutions since Fukuyama has meant the end of social revolutionary changes under the "end of history": a concept borrowed by him from Hegel and suggesting a rather Hegelian, dialectical "idea of history". In fact, Kuhn's "normal science", complemented by the condition to be permanent and "endless", "eternal", i.e., without those discontinuous periods of "paradigm change" metaphorically called 4 Many papers discuss Kuhn's conception relevantly to the present context (e.g., Kvasz 2014;Sismondo 2012;Wray 2012;Kindi 2005;Larvor 2003;Reisch, 2003;Chen, Andersen, Barker 1998;Corry 1993: Hoyningen-Huene 1993Keith, Zagacki 1992;Gernand, Reedy 1986;Moore 1980;Stanfield 1974;Shapere 1964); many others consider the conception of "scientific revolution" more or less creatively (by the by, including the present essay), but obviously inspired by his idea (as to the context here, e.g., Parrinder 2015;Kornmesser 2014;Roth 2013;Bland 2012;Kondratiuk, Siudem, Hołyst 2012;Wray 2012a;Barker 2011;Dorato 2008;2008a;Perla, Carifio;Barnet 2000;Dyson 1999;Kvasz 1999;Andersen 1998;La Cerra Kurzban 1995;Mayr 1994;Schipper 1988;Yalow 1986;Elguea 1985;Sterman 1985;Wieland 1985;Audretsch 1981;…”