The Cognitive Revolution and the Political Psychology of Elite Decision Making

Abstract

Experimental evidence in cognitive psychology and behavioral economics is transforming the way political science scholars think about how humans make decisions in areas of high complexity, uncertainty, and risk. Nearly all those studies utilize convenience samples of university students, but in the real world political elites actually make most pivotal political decisions such as threatening war or changing the course of economic policy. Highly experienced elites are more likely to exhibit the attributes of rational decisionmaking; and over the last fifteen years a wealth of studies suggest that such elites are likely to be more skilled in strategic bargaining than samples with less germane experience. However, elites are also more likely to suffer overconfidence, which degrades decisionmaking skills. We illustrate implications for political science with a case study of crisis bargaining between the US and North Korea. Variations in the experience of US elite decision-makers between 2002 and 2006 plausibly explain the large shift in US crisis signaling better than other rival hypotheses such as "Iraq fatigue." Beyond crisis bargaining other major political science theories might benefit from attention to the attributes of individual decision-makers.F or decades, a cognitive revolution has been sweeping across the many fields of social science. The key insight from this revolution is that human decisionmaking is far from perfectly rational yet follows certain patterns that are relevant for economic and political behavior. Most of the evidence about human behavior has come from experimental studies on students and other subjects that are readily available to university professors in large numbers, at little cost. 1 Such studies have immediate relevance for understanding some kinds of political behavior, such as voting, that involves analogous populations. 2 Much of politics, however, hinges on the behavior of senior politicians and bureaucrats who run national governments and international organizations. Unfortunately, experienced elites are difficult to obtain as subjects because they are generally busy, wary of clinical poking, and skittish about revealing information about their decisionmaking processes and particular choices. 3 When elites do consent to such research, sample sizes are exceptionally small, making it hard to draw general inferences. While many political scientists do acknowledge that there are differences between how elites and novices reason, the literature generally downplays such differences.A small but growing number of experimental studies done mainly in the last two decades suggests that experienced elites act differently from the population of less experienced university students who have been the mainstay of research in political psychology, behavioral economics and related scholarship on the psychology of decision-making. 4 We make two arguments about the importance of this cognitive revolution for political science. First, on methods, when studying elite decision making it is importa...

Bureaucratic expertise, overconfidence, and policy choice

“…Similar findings are reported in other studies, confirming the prevalence of this relationship (Glaser & Weber, 2007;Heath & Tversky, 1991;Kirchler & Maciejovsky, 2002). In a review of recent cognitive research of elite decision making, Hafner-Burton et al (2013) argue that in politics and government, experienced elites may be more prone to overconfidence than less experienced elites. In a review of recent cognitive research of elite decision making, Hafner-Burton et al (2013) argue that in politics and government, experienced elites may be more prone to overconfidence than less experienced elites.…”

“…One bias in selfperception, as shown in extant literature, is the tendency toward overconfidence. Numerous studies suggest that overestimation or overconfidence-"believing you are better than you are in reality" (Johnson & Fowler, 2011)-is also frequently seen in experts across a wide range of professions, ranging from business operation (Galasso & Simcoe, 2011;Malmendier & Tate, 2005;Schrand & Zechman, 2012) and marketing management (Mahajan, 1992) to financial investment (Barber & Odean, 2001), health care (Baumann et al, 1991), engineering (Lin & Bier, 2008), professional sports (Massey & Thaler, 2010), political economy (Scheinkman & Xiong, 2003), and policy decision making (Hafner-Burton, Hughes, & Victor, 2013;Tetlock, 2005). Numerous studies suggest that overestimation or overconfidence-"believing you are better than you are in reality" (Johnson & Fowler, 2011)-is also frequently seen in experts across a wide range of professions, ranging from business operation (Galasso & Simcoe, 2011;Malmendier & Tate, 2005;Schrand & Zechman, 2012) and marketing management (Mahajan, 1992) to financial investment (Barber & Odean, 2001), health care (Baumann et al, 1991), engineering (Lin & Bier, 2008), professional sports (Massey & Thaler, 2010), political economy (Scheinkman & Xiong, 2003), and policy decision making (Hafner-Burton, Hughes, & Victor, 2013;Tetlock, 2005).…”

“…Psychological studies have long shown that most people tend to overestimate their own relative abilities (e.g., Weinstein, 1980). Numerous studies suggest that overestimation or overconfidence-"believing you are better than you are in reality" (Johnson & Fowler, 2011)-is also frequently seen in experts across a wide range of professions, ranging from business operation (Galasso & Simcoe, 2011;Malmendier & Tate, 2005;Schrand & Zechman, 2012) and marketing management (Mahajan, 1992) to financial investment (Barber & Odean, 2001), health care (Baumann et al, 1991), engineering (Lin & Bier, 2008), professional sports (Massey & Thaler, 2010), political economy (Scheinkman & Xiong, 2003), and policy decision making (Hafner-Burton, Hughes, & Victor, 2013;Tetlock, 2005). While there are multiple meanings associated with the term overconfidence as used in past research, recent studies have clarified the concept of overconfidence itself (see Larrick, Burson, & Soll, 2007) and identified three key dimensions or subtypes of overconfidence (see Moore & Healy, 2008).…”

The Impact of GOTV Depends Upon Campaign Context: A Field Experiment in the 2014 California Primary

“…In this setting, voters (and elites) develop heuristics to readily incorporate new campaign contact (Chen and Chaiken 1999;Chong and Druckman 2007;Hill et al 2013;Hafner-Burton, Hughes, and Victor 2013). Not only are voters in these districts often exposed to political information in election cycles, but they are also likely to experience political discussion even in off-election years (Walsh 2004).…”

No Substitute for Experience: Presidents, Advisers, and Information in Group Decision Making

“…Experienced elites think more strategically and are less prone to certain kinds of bias. 4 Yet experience can lead to other biases like overconfidence, and may not lead to better judgment. 5 We still know little about when the benefits or drawbacks of experience will dominate.…”