The cognitive neuroscience of deception

Ganis, Giorgio; Keenan, Julian Paul

doi:10.1080/17470910802507660

Cited by 36 publications

(20 citation statements)

References 13 publications

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“…of external cues to self-regulation) elicits a reduction in the expression of racial bias [18], [19], [20]. Importantly, under realistic deception situations people risk to loose their social capital [21]. Thus, the decision to deceive has to take into account the ability to manage one's own reputation.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Situational and Dispositional Determinants of Intentional Deceiving

2011

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Does opportunity make the thief or are people dispositionally prone to deceive? The interaction between personality and the circumstances surrounding deception is crucial to understand what promotes dishonesty in our society. Due to its inherent spontaneity and sociality, deceptive behaviour may be hardly reproducible in experimental settings. We developed a novel paradigm in the form of an interactive game where participants can choose whether to lie to another person in situations of loss vs. gain, and of no-reputation-risk vs. reputation-risk linked to the disclosure of their deceptive behaviour to others. Thus, our ecological paradigm allowed subjects to spontaneously decide when to lie and face the challenge of deceiving others. In the case of loss, participants lied to reverse the outcome in their favour. Deception was lower in the reputation-risk condition where personality traits concerning social interactions also played an important role.The results suggest that deception is definitely promoted by unfavourable events, and that maintaining one's own reputation encourages honesty, particularly in socially inclined individuals.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Situational and Dispositional Determinants of Intentional Deceiving

2011

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“…There are increasing studies aiming to de-couple different sub-types of deceptions. For instance, people may tell lies either about others or about oneself; the event people may lie about could be experienced or not-experienced; the lies could also either be spontaneous or be well-practiced (Ganis et al, 2003, 2009; Abe et al, 2006; Johnson et al, 2008; Walczyk et al, 2009; Hu et al, 2011). These studies have consistently found that different types of lies showed different behavioral patterns, as well as non-overlapping neural activities.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Repeated Lie Becomes a Truth? The Effect of Intentional Control and Training on Deception

Hu¹,

Chen²,

Fu³

2012

Front. Psychology

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Deception has been demonstrated as a task that involves executive control such as conflict monitoring and response inhibition. In the present study, we investigated whether or not the controlled processes associated with deception could be trained to be more efficient. Forty-eight participants finished a reaction time-based differentiation of deception paradigm (DDP) task using self- and other-referential information on two occasions. After the first baseline DDP task, participants were randomly assigned to one of three groups: a control group in which participants finished the same task for a second time; an instruction group in which participants were instructed to speed up their deceptive responses in the second DDP; a training group in which participants received training in speeding up their deceptive responses, and then proceeded to the second DDP. Results showed that instruction alone significantly reduced the RTs associated with participants’ deceptive responses. However, the differences between deceptive and truthful responses were erased only in the training group. The result suggests that the performance associated with deception is malleable and could be voluntarily controlled with intention or training.

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“…Within the last two decades, there has been increasing interest in the use of neurophysiological measures in order to detect malingering and deception (e.g., Appelbaum, 2007;Gaetz, 2002;Ganis & Keenan, 2009;Rosenfeld, 2002;Vagnini, Berry, Clark, & Jiang, 2008). One of the main draws of using neurophysiological measures is the assumption that humans exert less control over their cognitive processes than over their behavioral and verbal responses, and hence these techniques may provide an alternative mode for the identification of deception.…”

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confidence: 98%

Impact of stimulus similarity between the probe and the irrelevant items during a card-playing deception detection task: The “irrelevants” are not irrelevant

Marchand

Inglis-Assaff

Lefebvre

2013

Journal of Clinical and Experimental Neuropsychology

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Event-related brain potential paradigms for the detection of concealed information commonly involve presenting probes embedded within a series of irrelevant items. This study investigated the impact of similarity of the irrelevant items with the probe. For the task, a card was shown followed by the sequential presentation of six "test" cards, one of which was the same as the initial card (the probe) along with five "irrelevant" cards that varied in terms of similarity with the probe. Participants either identified or denied recognition of the probe. The results show that P300 amplitude is modulated by stimulus similarity and highlight the importance of the irrelevant items on deception detection rates.

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The cognitive neuroscience of deception

Cited by 36 publications

References 13 publications

Situational and Dispositional Determinants of Intentional Deceiving

Situational and Dispositional Determinants of Intentional Deceiving

A Repeated Lie Becomes a Truth? The Effect of Intentional Control and Training on Deception

Impact of stimulus similarity between the probe and the irrelevant items during a card-playing deception detection task: The “irrelevants” are not irrelevant

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