1977
DOI: 10.1037/0022-3514.35.1.49
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The cognitive dynamics of salience in the attribution process.

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Cited by 213 publications
(108 citation statements)
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References 13 publications
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“…He concluded that such episodic stories evoke individualistic attributions of responsibility for the societallevel problems emphasized in the news frame. These findings are consistent with earlier investigations in social psychology that established attribution processes are susceptible to accessibility effects (e.g., Anderson and Slusher 1986;Pryor and Kriss 1977;Rholes and Pryor 1982;Smith and Miller 1979). For example, Rholes and Pryor (1982) provided data showing that recently activated causal agents are given more weight in making causal judgments.…”
Section: Issue Framing In Policy Debatessupporting
confidence: 81%
“…He concluded that such episodic stories evoke individualistic attributions of responsibility for the societallevel problems emphasized in the news frame. These findings are consistent with earlier investigations in social psychology that established attribution processes are susceptible to accessibility effects (e.g., Anderson and Slusher 1986;Pryor and Kriss 1977;Rholes and Pryor 1982;Smith and Miller 1979). For example, Rholes and Pryor (1982) provided data showing that recently activated causal agents are given more weight in making causal judgments.…”
Section: Issue Framing In Policy Debatessupporting
confidence: 81%
“…If an implicit misattribution mechanism is at work, individuals should be more likely to misattribute the evaluation activated by the US to the CS when that CS is relatively salient. A well-documented finding in attribution research is that as the salience of a plausible causal source increases, so does the likelihood that individuals will make attributions to that source (Heider, 1958;Jones & Nisbett, 1971;Pryor & Kriss, 1977;Taylor & Fiske, 1978). Therefore, source confusion is likely when the actual source of the evaluation is low in salience while another appropriate object is highly salient.…”
Section: Studymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The key difference is that in the prose-copying study attention was directed to the standard immediately following failure feedback. This conjoined the aversive failure experience and the standard (Pryor & Kriss, 1977;Taylor & Fiske, 1978) and thus promoted attribution to the standard (Duval & Duval, 1983). In the moral hypocrisy study, the standard was emphasized before people made their moral decisions and had the possibility to fail.…”
Section: Changing Moral Standardsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Duval and Lalwani (1999) proposed that causal attribution is the mechanism that determines whether self or standards will be changed. Attentional focus partially determines causal attributions (Arkin & Duval, 1975;Duval & Duval, 1983;Pryor & Kriss, 1977;Taylor & Fiske, 1978), so focusing on the standard leads people to attribute the cause of the discrepancy to the standard. When attention is focused on their own performance, however, people attribute causality for the discrepancy to self.…”
Section: Attribution and Changing Standardsmentioning
confidence: 99%