The Co-evolution of Honesty and Strategic Vigilance

Abstract

We hypothesize that when honesty is not motivated by selfish goals, it reveals social preferences that have evolved for convincing strategically vigilant partners that one is a person worth cooperating with. In particular, we explain how the patterns of dishonest behavior observed in recent experiments can be motivated by preferences for social and self-esteem. These preferences have evolved because they are adaptive in an environment where it is advantageous to be selected as a partner by others and where these others are strategically vigilant: they efficiently evaluate the expected benefit of cooperating with specific partners and attend to their intentions. We specify the adaptive value of strategic vigilance and preferences for social and self-esteem. We argue that evolved preferences for social and self-esteem are satisfied by applying mechanisms of strategic vigilance to one's own behavior. We further argue that such cognitive processes obviate the need for the evolution of preferences for fairness and social norm compliance.

Toward a Unified Theory of Learned Trust in Interpersonal and Human-Machine Interactions

“…The assumption is that trustworthiness is not always evident or easy to detect and trustees may have reasons to concede their actual level of trustworthiness. Trustors need to exert social intelligence [42] or strategic vigilance [52] to detect trustworthiness based on signals or cues. If we define trait trust as "default expectations of trustworthiness of others" (Yamagishi et al [42], p. 158), the above correlation can be stated as "the better you are at detecting trustworthiness, the higher you expect it to be by default."…”

Being Good to Look Good: Self-Reported Moral Character Predicts Moral Double Standards Among Reputation-Seeking Individuals

“…People with a strong moral character might be expected to follow this Golden Rule, and judge others no more harshly than they judge themselves. But from an evolutionary perspective, cultivating a strong moral character serves a reputation management function (Heintz et al, 2016;Trivers, 1971), and facilitates socially desirable reactions in a prompt and heuristic way (Hardy & Van Vugt, 2006;Jordan et al, 2016;Jordan & Rand, 2020). In this case, criticizing others' transgressions can be a relatively costeffective approach to demonstrate one's moral character to others (Crockett, 2017;Jordan et al, 2017;Simpson et al, 2013).…”

“…From an evolutionary perspective, however, one key function of being a moral person is to maintain a moral reputation, thereby attracting cooperators and avoiding social exclusion (Nowak & Sigmund, 2005;Sperber & Baumard, 2012;Vonasch et al, 2018). One of the best ways to acquire and maintain a moral reputation is to internalize a strong moral character (Heintz et al, 2016;Trivers, 1971). Facing various moral tests in daily life, moral character can prompt people to act in socially desirable ways (Jordan et al, 2016;Jordan & Rand, 2020;Paulhus, 1984), and serve to appear moral to others (Batson et al, 1997(Batson et al, , 1999Lönnqvist et al, 2015;Shaw et al, 2014).…”

Modelling a socialised chatbot using trust development in children: lessons learnt from Tay

“…interactions with parents) [31] and the state of the society we inhabit [32]. We have an inbuilt capacity for scepticism, and we do not naively emulate and imitate anyone and everyone, thanks to our evolutionary past [33, 34].…”