The choice between union membership and free-rider status

Chaison, Gary N.; Dhavale, Dileep G.

doi:10.1007/bf02685526

Cited by 36 publications

(32 citation statements)

References 11 publications

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“…However, a free-rider problem arises when unorganized workers receive the same wages as union members, as is common under erga omnes contracts and multiemployer bargaining in continental Europe (Traxler, 1994). Hence, when wage rises are a quasi-public good which can not be withheld from non-members (Chaison and Dhavale, 1992), inflation may not help unions to attract members (Richardson, 1978: 103).…”

Section: Business Cyclesmentioning

confidence: 99%

When Institutions Matter:Union Growth and Decline in Western Europe, 1950-1995

Ebbinghaus

Visser

1999

European Sociological Review

321

244

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During the early post-war period, Western trade union movements grew in membership and achieved an institutionalized role in industrial relations and politics. However, during the last decades, many trade unions have seen their membership decline as they came increasingly under pressures due to the social, economic and political changes. This article reviews the main structural, cyclical and institutional factors explaining union growth and decline. Concentrating on Western Europe, the empirical analysis compares cross-national union density data for 13 countries over the first period and for 16 countries over the second, "crisis" period . The quantitative correlation and regression analysis indicates that structural and cyclical factors fail explain the level and changes in unionization across Western Europe, while institutional variables fare better. In a second, qualitative comparative analysis, the authors stress the need to explain cross-national differences in the level or trend of unionization by a set of institutional arrangements: the access of unions to representation in the workplace, the availability of a selective incentive in the form of a union-administered unemployment scheme, recognition of employers through nation-wide and sectoral corporatist institutions, and closed shop arrangements for forced membership. Such institutional configurations support membership recruitment and membership retention, and define the conditions for the strategic choice of trade unions in responding to structural social-economic, political and cultural changes. Acknowledgement

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Section: Business Cyclesmentioning

confidence: 99%

When Institutions Matter:Union Growth and Decline in Western Europe, 1950-1995

Ebbinghaus

Visser

1999

European Sociological Review

321

244

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“…The more freeriders there are, however, the less effective the union will be and the benefits of unionization will be eroded. One strand of research in this area has focused on this freerider aspect of covered nonmembers (Booth 19 85;Naylor 1989;Chaison and Dhavale 1992;Davis and Huston 1993;Naylor and Cripps 1993;Sobel 1995).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

What Explains Wage Differences between Union Members and Covered Nonmembers?

Schumacher¹

1999

Southern Economic Journal

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An individual covered by a collective bargaining agreement but who is not a union member is estimated to earn about 13% lower wages than a union member. Sectors with relatively few covered nonmembers are associated with a large coverage differential, while sectors with high proportions of covered nonmembers are associated with small differentials. This suggests free riders either weaken the bargaining position of the union or weak bargaining positions increase the incentive to freeride. Only a modest amount of this differential is accounted for by un measured ability, the probationary period associated with newly hired union workers, or union status misclassification.

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“…Educational attainment has a substantial positive association with free riding. There is also evidence that whites, southerners, white-collar workers, and service-sector workers are more likely than others to free ride (Sobel, 1995;Davis and Huston, 1993;Chaison and Dhavale, 1992). The studies do not provide a clear explanation for this pattern of results, however, as several reasons have potential merit.…”

Section: Empirical Research On Rtw Lawsmentioning

confidence: 72%

“…Haggard's (1990) bibliography reported that nearly 50 empirical studies of RTW laws were conducted between the late 1950s and 1990. Although the RTW issue has not been as popular in the 1990s as it was in the past, RTW studies have continued to accumulate (Davis and Huston, 1995;Sobel, 1995;Chaison and Dhavale, 1992;Garofalo and Malhotra, 1992;Zax and Ichniowski, 1991;Canak and Miller, 1990). Unfortunately, the two empirical streams of this research barrage have not definitively indicated whether unions are weakened by RTW laws.…”

Section: Empirical Research On Rtw Lawsmentioning

confidence: 82%

“…During the 1990s, several scholars departed from the traditional economic studies of RTW laws to focus broadly on the free-rider hypothesis (Sobel, 1995;Davis and Huston, 1993;Chaison and Dhavale, 1992;Zax and Ichniowski, 1991). This work sought to identify who becomes free riders and to resolve some contradictions in RTW research (Sobel, 1995, pp.…”

Section: Empirical Research On Rtw Lawsmentioning

confidence: 98%

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