The Causal Self-Referential Theory of Perception Revisited

Abstract

This is a paper about The Causal Self‐Referential Theory of Perception. According to The Causal Self‐Referential Theory as developed by above all John Searle and David Woodruff Smith, perceptual content is satisfied by an object only if the object in question has caused the perceptual experience. I argue initially that Searle's account cannot explain the distinction between hallucination and illusion since it requires that the state of affairs that is presented in the perceptual experience must exist in order for the perception to be veridical. Smith's account is interestingly different in that the descriptive content, i.e. the content that presents the perceptual object as having certain properties, does not determine the object of the experience. His account consequently does not require that the state of affairs that is presented in perception exists in order for the perception to have an object. Smith argues instead that perceptual reference is determined by a specific kind of demonstrative content. In this paper it is argued that Smith's account of demonstrative content is too indeterminate and in certain circumstances prescribes the wrong object. It is subsequently argued that the theory of demonstrative content can be modified so as to avoid these consequences. This modification involves deriving the conditions of satisfaction of seeing an object from the conditions of satisfaction of seeing the shape of the object, where the shape of the object is conceived of as a particularized property, what is also called a ‘trope’.

Particularity of Content and Illusions of Identity

“…In this case, the content associated with a veridical experience as of a red object would be R(a) where a is the particular object that is perceived by a subject. Constants can be interpreted as proper names denoting particulars, or as demonstrative terms like this or that designating particular entities to which a subject is perceptually related (Almäng 2013;Brewer 2006).…”

“…From the Russellian perspective, the formula R(a) is interpreted as describing the object a as having the property of redness, while from the Fragean perspective the same formula characterizes the object a under the red mode of presentation or as distinguished by applying the concept of redness. Furthermore, I only consider whether particular objects figure in content, and my argumentation does not address the issue of whether perceptually experienced properties are universals or tropes (Almäng 2013;Mulligan 1999;Nanay 2012). In addition, I consider so-called 'self-referential' contents, which include a reference to the experience or the subject itself, as general contents because their particular elements are not objects that are perceived by a subject (Burge 1991;Prat 2006).…”

“…A popular way to amend this problem is to extend the general content, such that it encompasses the occurrence of perceptual relations (see Burge 1991;Almäng 2013;Schroer 2014;Searle 1983 for variants). Such notions of content are often called self-referential, since according to them, a part of the content specifies a relation between objects and the experience (or the perceptual system, or the subject) itself.…”

“…In this case, the content associated with a veridical experience as of a red object would be R(a) where a is the particular object that is perceived by a subject. Constants can be interpreted as proper names denoting particulars, or as demonstrative terms like this or that designating particular entities to which a subject is perceptually related (Almäng 2013;Brewer 2006).While I use the terminology of attributing properties to objects, nothing in the presented argumentation relies on whether one accepts a Russellian or a Fregean theory of perceptual content (Chalmers 2006;Schellenberg 2011). From the Russellian perspective, the formula R(a) is interpreted as describing the object a as having the property of redness, while from the Fragean perspective the same formula characterizes the object a under the red mode of presentation or as distinguished by applying the concept of redness.…”

“…This assumption contains two claims. First is that objects that are necessary for accuracy have to be connected with a subject by a perceptual relation probably involving, inter alia, a causal link between an object's surface and perceptual mechanisms (Almäng 2013;Byrne 2001;Prat 2006; Soteriou 2000). The theoretical importance of this claim can again be demonstrated by referring to the veridical illusion case above.…”