Particularity of Content and Illusions of Identity

Abstract

This paper argues that the accuracy of perceptual experiences cannot be properly characterized by using the particular notion of content without breaking one of the three plausible assumptions. On the other hand, the general notion of content is not threatened by this problem. The first assumption is that all elements of content determine the accuracy conditions of an experience. The second states that objects needed for the accuracy of experiences are physical entities that stand in a perceptual relation to a subject. According to the third assumption, common experiences do not have accuracy conditions that are impossible to satisfy. The above point is demonstrated by analysing illusions of identity in which the number of objects is represented incorrectly. In the concluding parts of the paper, I investigate how an alternative account of particular content can be developed by rejecting the first assumption.Keywords Perception · Illusions · Hallucinations · General content · Particular content · AccuracyThe notion of "representational content" is one of the crucial concepts in contemporary debates concerning perceptual experiences. It is used to express the intuition that perceptual experiences present the world as being in the certain way and in doing so they may be accurate or inaccurate (Bach 2007;Byrne 2001;Byrne and Logue 2008;Chalmers 2006;Kriegel 2009;Schellenberg 2011). For instance, if one has an experience as of a red square, then a red square is a content of one's experience, and without the presence of such a square the experience would not be accurate. For this reason, it is common to characterize representational content as determining the accuracy conditions of perceptual experiences, or even as being identical to their accuracy conditions (Schellenberg 2011; Siegel 2010). Philosophers of perception disagree on whether the notion of "representational content" is needed to adequately characterize perceptual experiences (Brewer 2006;Genone 2014;Schellenberg 2010;Travis 2014). However, in this paper I address a more specific issue that concerns those positions in which it is accepted that perceptual experiences have content: a distinction between general and particular content (Martin 2002;Prat 2006;Schellenberg 2016; Soteriou 2000). According to the general content view, the representational content specifies an object that has certain features, for instance a red square. In contrast, in the case of particular content, what is specified is not an object with certain features, but the particular object: this particular red square and not an indefinite red square.In recent years many authors have developed arguments aimed to show that the particular notion of content has significant advantages over the general notion. These arguments can be divided into three general types. First, it is claimed that general content is implausible given the phenomenology of perceptual experiences (Schellenberg 2016;Martin 2002). Second, it has been proposed that general content cannot account for higher-order ...