The case for an independent European central bank: A reassessment of evidence and sources

Forder, James

doi:10.1016/s0176-2680(97)00047-5

Cited by 75 publications

(23 citation statements)

References 3 publications

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“…In addition, the consequences of granting independence to a central bank, above all for democratic accountability and responsibility, are not uncontentious (see, e.g., de Haan et al 1998 andBlinder, 1999). Finally, it should be noted that sharp criticisms have also been levelled against both the logic of the arguments pointing to central bank independence as a means of achieving lower inflation (Forder 1998a) and to the way in which economists have gone about constructing their measures of central bank independence (Forder 1998b;Mangano 1998).…”

Section: How Fiscal and Monetary Policies Are Influenced By Partisan mentioning

confidence: 99%

Partisanship in the setting and coordination of fiscal and monetary policies

Cusack

2001

European J Political Res

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The principal concerns of this paper are with the roles partisan politics have played in the making of fiscal and monetary policies within OECD countries as well as the extent to which these policies have complemented each other. It is argued that parties of the left pursue fiscal policies that are distinctly different from those pursued by the right. The critical difference is in the way these parties use fiscal policy as a corrective mechanism for dealing with macroeconomic problems: leftist parties adopt counter-cyclical fiscal policies while rightwing parties adhere to pro-cyclical fiscal stances. The paper also examines two arguments regarding monetary policy and how partisan politics affect this policy area. The first and most conventional argument sees the formal independence of the central bank from government as a means of negating partisan influences on monetary policy; the second advances the proposition that, regardless of central bank independence, monetary authorities are not politically neutral but instead share views similar to those of parties on the right-hand side of the political spectrum. Empirical analysis, using a pooled cross-section time-series design with data from 14 countries between 1961 and 1994, produces evidence in favor of the argument concerning the role of partisanship in fiscal policy; it also shows little support for the view that central bank independence inhibits partisan influences while at the same time provides support for the thesis that central banks are politically non-neutral. Thus, coordination between fiscal and monetary policies is far less likely to occur when left-wing parties are in power.

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Section: How Fiscal and Monetary Policies Are Influenced By Partisan mentioning

confidence: 99%

Partisanship in the setting and coordination of fiscal and monetary policies

Cusack

2001

European J Political Res

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“…Hayo and Hefeker (2002) used historic data showing that the CBI is not a necessary source for price stability in many countries. Forder (1988) proves that upon correction of certain subjective inclinations, negative correlation between CBI and inflation could even disappear. Mangano (1998) came to the similar conclusion, while Posen (1998) and Jordan (1997) explain that a higher grade of CBI is connected to the periods of higher expenses of disinflation.…”

Section: Theoretical Attitudes On the Cbi And An Outline Of The Empirmentioning

confidence: 92%

Legal central bank independence and inflation in various phases of transition

Piplica

2015

Economic Research-Ekonomska Istraživanja

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The transition environment of 11 EU member countries has created an exceptional opportunity for research on the influence of legal central bank independence (LCBI) on inflation within significantly different circumstances in comparison to developed Western countries. I construct my own transformed GMT (TGMT) model for estimation of the LCBI, researching transition in its early stages and later on, thus comprising the total period of transition. Even in early stages of the transition LCBI has significantly negative effects on inflation. In later phases all the countries show evidently high levels of the LCBI and low inflation rates, but in this phase increasing the LCBI would not result in decreasing the inflation rate. Only studying the entire period of the transition would show that LCBI has significant negative influence on inflation, clearly showing different levels of the LCBI and inflation, which was not so obvious in shorter intervals. Moreover, negative influence of the LCBI on inflation does not change even if I add budget deficit as an independent variable to my research.

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“…Central bank independence (CBI) has been on the rise worldwide since the 1990s (Bibow 2004a, Forder 1998. In many cases, care has been taken in weaving the newly or more independent central bank into the democratic structures of the respective states involved.…”

Section: Central Bank Independence At Its Best-or Worst?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Europe's Quest for Monetary Stability. Central Banking Gone Astray

Bibow

2006

International Journal of Political Economy

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The case for an independent European central bank: A reassessment of evidence and sources

Cited by 75 publications

References 3 publications

Partisanship in the setting and coordination of fiscal and monetary policies

Partisanship in the setting and coordination of fiscal and monetary policies

Legal central bank independence and inflation in various phases of transition

Europe's Quest for Monetary Stability. Central Banking Gone Astray

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