2006
DOI: 10.2753/ijp0891-1916350102
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Europe's Quest for Monetary Stability. Central Banking Gone Astray

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Cited by 21 publications
(12 citation statements)
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“…On the monetary front the low level and asymmetrical nature of the inflation target set by the ECB creates selfinflicted credibility problems, and imparts an upward bias to interest rates that is widely perceived as a constraint on growth. Bibow (2005) likens it to driving a Ferrari with a foot permanently on the brake. From the perspective of the principle of effective demand it is apparent that the ECB strategy forces up the expected normal rate of interest producing a point of effective demand that inhibits growth in the absence of a buoyant marginal efficiency of capital.…”
Section: Assessment Of Post Keynesian Monetary Economicsmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…On the monetary front the low level and asymmetrical nature of the inflation target set by the ECB creates selfinflicted credibility problems, and imparts an upward bias to interest rates that is widely perceived as a constraint on growth. Bibow (2005) likens it to driving a Ferrari with a foot permanently on the brake. From the perspective of the principle of effective demand it is apparent that the ECB strategy forces up the expected normal rate of interest producing a point of effective demand that inhibits growth in the absence of a buoyant marginal efficiency of capital.…”
Section: Assessment Of Post Keynesian Monetary Economicsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…As Bibow (2005) also explains, the dual objectives of price stability and high employment required by the Treaty on European Union have been conflated by the ECB into the single objective of price stability. What is more ironic, the ECB has been cut free from public control in the name of central bank independence!…”
Section: Assessment Of Post Keynesian Monetary Economicsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Wage policies, however, may not only affect prices, but may also change distribution if firms do not completely pass unit labour cost variations to prices or if prices of other inputs do not change in step 7 The ECB has tended to tighten whenever inflation increased above the target without relaxing when inflation expectations came down. For a general critique of the ECB's 'anti-growth bias' see Bibow (2002Bibow ( , 2005aBibow ( , 2005b and Hein (2002). 8 See Arestis/Sawyer (2005) and Sawyer (2002) for recent post-Keynesian models of distribution conflict and inflation, and Hein (2006aHein ( , 2006b for the integration of real debt effects into Kaleckian models of distribution and growth with conflict inflation.…”
Section: Fiscal Policymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…5 The ECB has tended to tighten whenever inflation increased above the target without relaxing when inflation expectations came down. For a general critique of the ECB's 'anti-growth bias' see Bibow (2002Bibow ( , 2005aBibow ( , 2005b Hein (2002) and Hein/Truger (2006b Hein (2006aHein ( , 2006b) for the integration of real debt effects into Kaleckian models of distribution and growth with conflict inflation.…”
Section: The Macroeconomic Impact Of Monetary Policy and Wage Developmentioning
confidence: 99%