The burden of embodied cognition.

Abstract

The thesis of embodied cognition has developed as an alternative to the view that cognition is mediated, at least in part, by symbolic representations. A useful testing ground for the embodied cognition hypothesis is the representation of concepts. An embodied view of concept representation argues that concepts are represented in a modality-specific format. I argue that questions about representational format are tractable only in the context of explicit hypotheses about how information spreads among conceptual representations and sensorimotor systems. When reasonable alternatives to the embodied cognition hypothesis are clearly defined, the available evidence does not distinguish between the embodied cognition hypothesis and those alternatives. Furthermore, I argue, the available data that are theoretically constraining indicate that concepts are more than just sensory and motor content. As such, the embodied/nonembodied debate is either largely resolved or at a point where the embodied and nonembodied approaches are no longer coherently distinct theories. This situation merits a reconsideration of what the available evidence can tell us about the structure of the conceptual system. I suggest that it is the independence of thought from perception and action that makes human cognition special— and that independence is made possible by the representational distinction between concepts and sensorimotor representations.

Word meaning in the ventral visual path: a perceptual to conceptual gradient of semantic coding

“…All this evidence contributes to the description of a distributed and multidimensional semantic neural space, partially answering the question of how word meaning is encoded in the brain. A current debate, of interest for some, relates to the question of whether the format of the representation of the different stimulus features in the various brain regions is abstract or embodied (Glenberg, 2015;Mahon, 2015). Our study, by investigating the representational geometry of word meaning in different brain regions of the ventral stream elucidates where and how, in the brain, semantic information is encoded.…”

Toward a deeper understanding of embodiment.

“…Indeed, this evidence is consistent with Glenberg's (2015) claim that embodied aspects of experience are tightly integrated into conceptual knowledge and make necessary contributions to activities such as object identification and language comprehension. Mahon's (2015) counterpoint, however, is that we must also consider what findings might be expected under a viable alternative hypothesis. His position (see also Mahon & Caramazza, 2008) is that evidence for the involvement of embodied representations can be explained by activation spreading between brain regions (e.g., conceptual and motor systems).…”

“…This question is at the heart of the debate played out in the articles in this issue by Glenberg (2015) and Mahon (2015). A strong version of embodied representations, as espoused by Glenberg, holds that conceptual knowledge is closely integrated with sensorimotor experiences and even constrained by what our perceptual and motor systems are capable of experiencing and producing Glenberg, 1997).…”

“…Let us examine how some of the evidence for the embodied nature of conceptual representation might be viewed from the alternative perspective proposed by Mahon (2015). The striking neuroimaging evidence for activation of motor and premotor areas during tasks such as identifying objects or understanding language (e.g., Chao & Martin, 2000;Tettamanti et al, 2005) has an important shortcoming.…”

“…Two interesting undercurrents in the articles by Glenberg (2015) and Mahon (2015) are the allegorical use of the medieval notion of a flat Earth (Glenberg) and the view that human cognition is special (Mahon). The latter of these two conjured for me an additional allegory, one that harkens to the Victorian reaction to publication of Darwin's (1871) The Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex.…”