The Book of Evidence

Achinstein, Peter

doi:10.1093/0195143892.001.0001

Cited by 228 publications

(82 citation statements)

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“…For criticism of the direction of fit metaphor as a device for analyzing interests (and indeed beliefs), see Frost (2014). 27 For a detailed discussion of these issues, see Achinstein (2003). 28 What it means to 'promote' a desire or interest, and in particular whether promotion is always a matter of probability increasing, is a matter of some controversy.…”

Section: The Modal Strategymentioning

confidence: 99%

Epistemic instrumentalism and the reason to believe in accord with the evidence

Sharadin

2016

Synthese

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Epistemic instrumentalists face a puzzle. In brief, the puzzle is that if the reason there is to believe in accord with the evidence depends, as the instrumentalist says it does, on agents' idiosyncratic interests, then there is no reason to expect that this reason is universal. Here, I identify and explain two strategies instrumentalists have used to try and solve this puzzle. I then argue that we should find these strategies wanting. Faced with the failure of these strategies, I articulate a heretofore neglected solution on behalf of instrumentalism.

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Section: The Modal Strategymentioning

confidence: 99%

Epistemic instrumentalism and the reason to believe in accord with the evidence

Sharadin

2016

Synthese

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“…Note that 'evidence' in both [1] and [3] consists of the respective premises (Longino, 1979;Salmon, 1984b;Achinstein, 2001;Fitzhugh, 2012).…”

Section: Phylogenetic Reasoningmentioning

confidence: 99%

Character mapping and cladogram comparison versus the requirement of total evidence: does it matter for polychaete systematics?

Fitzhugh

2014

Mem. Mus. Vic.

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Fitzhugh, K. 2014. Character mapping and cladogram comparison versus the requirement of total evidence: does it matter for polychaete systematics? Memoirs of Museum Victoria 71: 67-78.The practice of partitioning data for the inferences of phylogenetic hypotheses has become a routine practice in biological systematics. Two popular approaches: (i) mapping 'morphological' characters onto 'molecular' phylogenies, and (ii) comparing 'morphological' and 'molecular' phylogenies, are examined in light of what is known as the requirement of total evidence. Inferences of phylogenetic hypotheses, indeed all taxa, occur by a type of non-deductive reasoning known as abduction. The intent of abduction is to offer at least tentative causal accounts that explain character data. The rational acceptance of abductively derived hypotheses is subject to conditions of the requirement of total evidence as a matter of the evidential support for those hypotheses. It is shown that both character mapping and comparisons of cladograms using partitioned datasets are procedures that severely reduce the credibility of phylogenetic hypotheses. This problem is alleviated by acknowledging the formal structure of the why-questions we ask in relation to character data, for which phylogenetic hypotheses serve as answers.

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“…6 It will not serve the pragmatic purposes of improving inquiry. A telling illustration of this occurs in (Achinstein 2001), which seeks to respond to the challenge to show how a philosophical theory of evidence can be relevant to scientific practice. As I argue in (Kitcher 2011a), for all his care and technical sophistication, Achinstein fails to meet the challenge.…”

Section: IIImentioning

confidence: 99%

Toward a Pragmatist Philosophy of Science

Kitcher

2013

THEORIA

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This three-part essay begins with a diagnosis of the career of general philosophy of science in the tradition begun by Hempel's reform of logical positivism. Since 1950, Anglophone philosophy of science has largely sought general accounts of confirmation, theory and explanation. It has not found them. Instead it has assembled some valuable tools for exploring problems in the natural and social sciences, and has put them to work in a range of useful studies. The second part of the essay pursues the question of whether there is a successor project to the general investigations that Hempel inspired. I argue that there are difficult methodological questions about collective inquiry that have largely been neglected. Attempts to answer these questions should expand the resources for philosophical understanding of scientific knowledge. The third part focuses on the situation of the sciences within society. Can scientific research be divorced from the interests of a broader public? Can its conclusions be generated in neglect of the evidential standards accepted by non-scientists? I argue for a development of the ideal of well-ordered science, and for the understanding of science (singular!) as one institution among others. Conceiving matters in this way recovers important themes from the neglected pragmatist tradition.Keywords: logical empiricism; pragmatism; social epistemology; science and society; well-ordered science; science and values.RESUMEN: Este ensayo en tres partes comienza con un diagnóstico de la trayectoria de la filosofía general de la ciencia, tal como se cultiva en la tradición que se origina con la reforma hempeliana del positivismo lógico. Desde 1950, la filosofía anglófona de la ciencia ha buscado enfoques generales sobre teorías, confirmación y explicación. Ha reunido, en cambio, algunas herramientas valiosas para explorar problemas en las ciencias naturales y sociales, aplicándolas en un buen número de estudios útiles. La segunda parte del ensayo se ocupa de la cuestión de si hay algún proyecto continuador del tipo de investigación general inspirada por Hempel. Sostengo que se han ignorado algunas cuestiones metodológicas difíciles sobre la investigación colectiva. Los intentos para responder a estas cuestiones debieran ampliar nuestros recursos para comprender filósoficamente el conocimiento científico. La tercera parte se ocupa de la la situación de las ciencias en la sociedad. ¿Puede la investigación científica divorciarse de los intereses del público general? ¿Pueden sus conclusiones ignorar el tipo de evidencia que aceptan los no científicos? Defiendo un desarrollo del ideal de una ciencia bien ordenada y una concepción de la ciencia (¡en singular!) como una institución entre otras. Este enfoque recuperar temas importantes de la olvidada tradición pragmatista.Palabras clave: empirismo lógico; pragmatismo; epistemología social; ciencia y sociedad; ciencia bien ordenada; ciencia y valores.* Delivering the Lullius Lectures, on which this essay is based, was both an honor and a great ple...

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The Book of Evidence

Cited by 228 publications

References 0 publications

Epistemic instrumentalism and the reason to believe in accord with the evidence

Epistemic instrumentalism and the reason to believe in accord with the evidence

Character mapping and cladogram comparison versus the requirement of total evidence: does it matter for polychaete systematics?

Toward a Pragmatist Philosophy of Science

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