Toward a Pragmatist Philosophy of Science

Abstract

This three-part essay begins with a diagnosis of the career of general philosophy of science in the tradition begun by Hempel's reform of logical positivism. Since 1950, Anglophone philosophy of science has largely sought general accounts of confirmation, theory and explanation. It has not found them. Instead it has assembled some valuable tools for exploring problems in the natural and social sciences, and has put them to work in a range of useful studies. The second part of the essay pursues the question of whether there is a successor project to the general investigations that Hempel inspired. I argue that there are difficult methodological questions about collective inquiry that have largely been neglected. Attempts to answer these questions should expand the resources for philosophical understanding of scientific knowledge. The third part focuses on the situation of the sciences within society. Can scientific research be divorced from the interests of a broader public? Can its conclusions be generated in neglect of the evidential standards accepted by non-scientists? I argue for a development of the ideal of well-ordered science, and for the understanding of science (singular!) as one institution among others. Conceiving matters in this way recovers important themes from the neglected pragmatist tradition.Keywords: logical empiricism; pragmatism; social epistemology; science and society; well-ordered science; science and values.RESUMEN: Este ensayo en tres partes comienza con un diagnóstico de la trayectoria de la filosofía general de la ciencia, tal como se cultiva en la tradición que se origina con la reforma hempeliana del positivismo lógico. Desde 1950, la filosofía anglófona de la ciencia ha buscado enfoques generales sobre teorías, confirmación y explicación. Ha reunido, en cambio, algunas herramientas valiosas para explorar problemas en las ciencias naturales y sociales, aplicándolas en un buen número de estudios útiles. La segunda parte del ensayo se ocupa de la cuestión de si hay algún proyecto continuador del tipo de investigación general inspirada por Hempel. Sostengo que se han ignorado algunas cuestiones metodológicas difíciles sobre la investigación colectiva. Los intentos para responder a estas cuestiones debieran ampliar nuestros recursos para comprender filósoficamente el conocimiento científico. La tercera parte se ocupa de la la situación de las ciencias en la sociedad. ¿Puede la investigación científica divorciarse de los intereses del público general? ¿Pueden sus conclusiones ignorar el tipo de evidencia que aceptan los no científicos? Defiendo un desarrollo del ideal de una ciencia bien ordenada y una concepción de la ciencia (¡en singular!) como una institución entre otras. Este enfoque recuperar temas importantes de la olvidada tradición pragmatista.Palabras clave: empirismo lógico; pragmatismo; epistemología social; ciencia y sociedad; ciencia bien ordenada; ciencia y valores.* Delivering the Lullius Lectures, on which this essay is based, was both an honor and a great ple...

Evolutionary Philosophy of Science: A New Image of Science and Stance towards General Philosophy of Science

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“…We contend that a pragmatic approach, which construes science as a social institution that progresses through solving certain kinds of problems (Laudan 1977, Doppelt 1981, Kitcher 2013, might be useful for informing scientific methodology in this regard. Growing out of classical projects of Dewey (1938), Peirce (1878), and James (1907), the pragmatist program has had a recent resurgence, e.g.…”

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