The Blocking Lemma and strategy-proofness in many-to-many matchings

Jiao, Zhenhua; Tian, Guoqiang

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2016.10.015

Cited by 10 publications

(11 citation statements)

References 28 publications

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“…Our results complement those in Kojima (2013) and Jiao and Tian (2017). In a multi-unit assignment problem, Kojima (2013) proves that the worker-optimal stable matching is strategy-proof for workers if and only if any cycle involves only the top-ranked workers, a condition that he calls essential homogeneity, which is weaker than the concept of acyclicity that we employ in this paper.…”

Section: Related Literaturesupporting

confidence: 71%

“…In a multi-unit assignment problem, Kojima (2013) proves that the worker-optimal stable matching is strategy-proof for workers if and only if any cycle involves only the top-ranked workers, a condition that he calls essential homogeneity, which is weaker than the concept of acyclicity that we employ in this paper. 2 Jiao and Tian (2017) prove that the worker-optimal stable mechanism is group strategy-proof for workers if preferences satisfy the extended max-min criterion and a quota saturability condition. The preference domain in Jiao and Tian (2017) reflects a high degree of ambiguity aversion.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Instead, we assume the preferences to be responsive. 3 The concept of group strategy-proofness that we employ is stronger than the one in Jiao and Tian (2017). For an allocation to be strategy-proof, they require that no coalition of agents can misrepresent their preferences in a way that makes each member of the coalition strictly better off.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

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Two-sided strategy-proofness in many-to-many matching markets

Romero‐Medina

Triossi

2020

Int J Game Theory

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We study the existence of group strategy-proof stable rules in many-to-many matching markets under responsiveness of agents’ preferences. We show that when firms have acyclical preferences over workers the set of stable matchings is a singleton, and the worker-optimal stable mechanism is a stable and group strategy-proof rule for firms and workers. Furthermore, acyclicity is the minimal condition guaranteeing the existence of stable and strategy-proof mechanisms in many-to-many matching markets.

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Section: Related Literaturesupporting

confidence: 71%

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

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Two-sided strategy-proofness in many-to-many matching markets

Romero‐Medina

Triossi

2020

Int J Game Theory

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“…The concept of strategic behavior [61] derives from economics, where the original implication is that firms take action that affects the market environment to increase profits (referring to the message response rate in this study), which is then extended to matching problems [35], such as mate matching.…”

Section: Strategic Behavior Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Economists usually study mate choice and marriage problem from the perspective of game theory and strategic behavior [30][31][32][33][34][35]. Considering the difference of mate choice for both sexes in marriage market, Becker regarded the marriage matching problem of mate choice as a frictionless matching process, and by constructing a matching model, Becker proved that the mate choice is not random, but a careful personal choice of attributes [30,31], which is later extended to a barging matching by Pollak et al [32].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Gender-specific preference in online dating

2019

EPJ Data Sci.

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In this paper, to reveal the differences of gender-specific preference and the factors affecting potential mate choice in online dating, we analyze the users' behavioral data of a large online dating site in China. We find that for women, network measures of popularity and activity of the men they contact are significantly positively associated with their messaging behaviors, while for men only the network measures of popularity of the women they contact are significantly positively associated with their messaging behaviors. Secondly, when women send messages to men, they pay attention to not only whether men's attributes meet their own requirements for mate choice, but also whether their own attributes meet men's requirements, while when men send messages to women, they only pay attention to whether women's attributes meet their own requirements. Thirdly, compared with men, women attach great importance to the socioeconomic status of potential partners and their own socioeconomic status will affect their enthusiasm for interaction with potential mates. Further, we use the ensemble learning classification methods to rank the importance of factors predicting messaging behaviors, and find that the centrality indices of users are the most important factors. Finally, by correlation analysis we find that men and women show different strategic behaviors when sending messages. Compared with men, for women sending messages, there is a stronger positive correlation between the centrality indices of women and men, and more women tend to send messages to people more popular than themselves. These results have implications for understanding gender-specific preference in online dating further and designing better recommendation engines for potential dates. The research also suggests new avenues for data-driven research on stable matching and strategic behavior combined with game theory.

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