The Biggest Auction Ever: The Sale of the British 3G Telecom Licences

Binmore, Ken; Klemperer, Paul

doi:10.1111/1468-0297.00020

Cited by 325 publications

(167 citation statements)

References 27 publications

(46 reference statements)

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“…Licences for third generation mobile phone bandwidth had been auctioned, giving the Government a £22 billion windfall. (The economists involved in its design trumpeted it as "the biggest auction ever" (Binmore and Klemperer, 2002)). As the stakes rose, so the NRPB's lack of control became clearer.…”

Section: Opening Upmentioning

confidence: 99%

Scientific advice on the move: the UK mobile phone risk issue as a public experiment

Stilgoe

2016

Palgrave Commun

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The UK controversy over the health risks of mobile phones was at its peak around 1999-2000, at a time when policymakers were beginning to endorse moves towards greater openness in the practice of expert advice. One explanation for the subsequent calming of this controversy is that people's sense of the benefits outweighed the minor uncertainties. However, this fails to explain the politics of mobile phone technology and, by positioning expert advice as neutral, offers no lessons for future expert practice. In this article, I argue that the mobile phones case can more productively be seen as one of public experiment. Rather than seeking closure, experts opened up the issue, made explicit previously obscured uncertainties and invited new research questions. In doing so, they remobilised previously static constructions of both science and public concern. This analysis challenges the distinction between science-as-expertise and science-as-experiment, with important implications for advisory practices and structures. This article is published as part of a thematic collection dedicated to scientific advice to governments.

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Section: Opening Upmentioning

confidence: 99%

Scientific advice on the move: the UK mobile phone risk issue as a public experiment

Stilgoe

2016

Palgrave Commun

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“…Implementation theory in the context of auctions is one such relatively new application of the game theoretic approach and it has yielded some significant results. One of the best known examples of its use is the auction of the UK Radio Spectrum (Binmore and Klemperer, 2002). The contribution made by game theoretic approaches to the design of policy -so-called "mechanism design", whereby sustainable, albeit second best solutions to economic and social problems (Binmore, 2007) can be sought -has in fact been developing for around three decades.…”

Section: Implicating Game Theory?mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Limits of Information? A Game Theoretic Contribution to Understanding the Development of an Indicators Policy for the UK Construction Industry

Rigby

Dewick

Courtney³

et al. 2011

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in AbstractIn the UK over the last decade, benchmarking has been consistently promoted as a solution to the problems of industry and the construction industry in particular. Government support of benchmarking in construction through the development of a key performance indicators programme found justification in the public goods aspects of the innovation process and because of the presence of market failures of information facing construction clients. However, attempts to merge benchmarking approaches into a single framework did not lead to a combined programme as intended. A game theoretic analysis of the implementation of government policy is presented to account for difficulties encountered by policy actors and to explain why a suitable mechanism to facilitate mutual benchmarking could not be devised. A key performance indicator (KPI) system that supports clients and suppliers in any sectorhere we consider construction -is highly problematic, not only because the types of information and types of processes that generate the information used by clients and suppliers are generally different, but because the exchange of information between 4 suppliers and clients and vice versa potentially leads to loss of commercially valuable information.

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“…It attracted a serious bid from a new entrant and shocked analysts with revenues of D 95 per capita, which almost double most expectations. See Klemperer (2002), and Binmore and Klemperer (2002) for more details. 10 In a recent empirical work, Caputo Silva and Kahn (2001) investigate heterogeneity across different categories of bidders and find evidence that suggests the importance of private components in bidders valuations in Brazilian auctions.…”

Section: The Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Auctions with asymmetric common-values: The first-price format

Frutos

Jarque

2007

Journal of Mathematical Economics

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We study the performance of the first-price format in auctions with asymmetric common-values. We show that, contrary to the result for second-price auctions, a small advantage for one player translates only to small changes in bidders' strategies, and the equilibrium remains close to the first-price equilibrium of the original game. We characterize the equilibrium bidding strategies and their behavior as the degree of asymmetry increases. Finally, we compare the revenues at the optimal auction, the first-price auction and the second-price auction.JEL classification: D44; D82; T96; G34

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The Biggest Auction Ever: The Sale of the British 3G Telecom Licences

Cited by 325 publications

References 27 publications

Scientific advice on the move: the UK mobile phone risk issue as a public experiment

Scientific advice on the move: the UK mobile phone risk issue as a public experiment

The Limits of Information? A Game Theoretic Contribution to Understanding the Development of an Indicators Policy for the UK Construction Industry

Auctions with asymmetric common-values: The first-price format

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