The Bias Paradox in Feminist Standpoint Epistemology

Abstract

Sandra Harding's feminist standpoint epistemology makes two claims. The thesis of epistemic privilege claims that unprivileged social positions are likely to generate perspectives that are “less partial and less distorted” than perspectives generated by other social positions. The situated knowledge thesis claims that all scientific knowledge is socially situated. The bias paradox is the tension between these two claims. Whereas the thesis of epistemic privilege relies on the assumption that a standard of impartiality enables one to judge some perspectives as better than others, the situated knowledge thesis seems to undermine this assumption by suggesting that all knowledge is partial. I argue that a contextualist theory of epistemic justification provides a solution to the bias paradox. Moreover, contextualism enables me to give empirical content to the thesis of epistemic privilege, thereby making it into a testable hypothesis.

Default Privilege and Bad Lots: Underconsideration and Explanatory Inference

“…Williams cites Carneades, Austin, Wittgenstein, and Harman as proleptic proponents of the default and challenge model. Rolin (2006; has also applied this model to issues in the social epistemology of science.…”

“…[8] Rolin (2006) provides additional examples of default entitlements, including middle range hypotheses and social and political values. Williams (2001) also notes that in many contexts, we have a default entitlement to deny sceptical hypotheses, e.g.…”

Feminist Philosophy of Economics

“…Harding's conception of "strong objectivity" is based on a contested view which I call the thesis of epistemic privilege [Rolin, 2006]. The thesis of epistemic privilege is the claim that those who are unprivileged with respect to their social positions are likely to be privileged with respect to gaining knowledge of social reality.…”

25 Years of Feminist Empiricism and Standpoint Theory: Where Are We Now?

“…Yet several contemporary standpoint theorists have worked to clarify the theses in ways that distance them from the problematic interpretations described above (Hartsock 1997; Wylie 2003; Harding 2004; Crasnow 2006; Rolin 2006). Wylie has acknowledged that for standpoint theory to be viable it must not presuppose an essentialist definition of the social categories by which standpoints are characterized, and it must not maintain that standpoints of the oppressed are automatically epistemically advantaged (Wylie 2003, 28).…”

“…Increasingly sophisticated forms of feminist empiricism have emerged that do not fit Harding's original characterization (Longino 1990; Nelson 1990; Campbell 1994; Anderson 2004; Clough 2004). Standpoint feminism has also become more nuanced, and proponents have distanced themselves from interpretations of standpoint claims that would clearly distinguish them from feminist empiricists (Harding 1993; Wylie 2001, 2003; Rolin 2006; Wylie and Nelson 2007). Thus, it is no longer clear what differences there are between contemporary versions of these two views or whether it makes sense to think of them as competing epistemological theories.…”