Feminist Philosophy of Economics

Rolin, Kristina

doi:10.1016/b978-0-444-51676-3.50008-7

Cited by 2 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 36 publications

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“…She writes that what is 'worrisome about allowing value judgments to guide scientific inquiry is […] that these judgments might be held dogmatically' ([2004], p. 11). Similarly, Rolin ([2012]) holds that values are an 'epistemic problem for science insofar as they lead scientists to dogmatism' (p. 211). In the same vein, Brown ([2013]) writes that the 'real problem [of values in science is] dogmatism about values ' (p. 838).…”

Section: An Objection -The Dogmatism Problemmentioning

confidence: 99%

Illegitimate Values, Confirmation Bias, and Mandevillian Cognition in Science

Peters¹

2021

The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

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The proposal that values in science are illegitimate and that they should be counteracted whenever they direct inquiry to the confirmation of predetermined conclusions is not uncommon in the philosophy of science. Drawing on recent research from cognitive science on human reasoning and confirmation bias, I argue that this view should be rejected. Values that drive inquiry to the confirmation of predetermined conclusions can contribute to the reliability of scientific inquiry at the group level, even when they negatively affect an individual’s cognition. This casts doubt on the proposal that such values should always be illegitimate in science. It also suggests that this proposal assumes a narrow, individualistic account of science that threatens to undermine the project of ensuring reliable belief-formation in science. 1Introduction2Advocates of the Confirmatory Value View3Versions of the Confirmatory Value View4Mandevillian Cognition and Why It Matters in Science4.1Recent research on human reasoning and confirmation bias4.2Mandevillian confirmation bias in science4.3Situating the argument5Against the Confirmatory Value View5.1Qualifications and clarifications5.2An objection: The dogmatism problem6Conclusion

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Section: An Objection -The Dogmatism Problemmentioning

confidence: 99%