The Best of Enemies

The Armistice Talks between Israel and Jordan, 1949: The View from Rhodes

“…Various scholars have credited this to the great 'abilities' and 'wisdom' of Abdullah and Ben-Gurion, who managed to get 'the maximum possible' without 'going to the brink'. 125 But the complete story of the armistice talks between Jordan and Israel has to include the third side of the triangle: Bunche and his colleagues at the UN headquarters in Rhodes. In stark contrast to all the other rounds of armistice talks, here Bunche did not initiate compromises, did not try to impose his positions, and ignored Israel's serious violations of the ceasefire throughout the negotiations.…”

The Conduct of Operations: Glubb Pasha, the Arab Legion, and the First Arab–Israeli War, 1948–49

“…51 With Glubb's knowledge of history and sense of topography set alongside his army training, he fixed on Jerusalem as the operational pivot for the entire operation west of the Jordan, compounded now by the presence of 100,000 Israelis in the western city, in the old city's Jewish quarter, and in settlements in hills to the east. 52 Jerusalem was 'the key to the military situation' for Glubb as from there the Israelis could advance downhill the short distance east to Jericho, seize the Allenby Bridge, and then 'the Arab Legion in Palestine would be cut off from its base, and would suffer a military disaster'. 53 As Glubb wrote in a chapter draft, 'There seemed to be no alternative but to break into Jerusalem from the north, clear Sheikh Jarrah and establish contact with the Old City.…”

“…61 Bar-Joseph intimates that the Jordanian commander of the 4 th Mechanized Regiment unilaterally moved his men to Latrun, presenting Glubb with a fait accompli: 'Once in Latrun, Glubb could no longer withdraw.' 62 Glubb…”