The Arab—Israeli Conflict: Learning Conflict Resolution

Bar-Siman-Tov, Yaacov

doi:10.1177/0022343394031001007

Cited by 22 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 10 publications

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“…In the past, it was limited to academic literature, which focused on psychological predicaments, contradictory and conflicting historical narratives, mental and value obstacles, and the different concept of justice that impeded reconciliation between the two peoples. The Israeli academic literature has used these factors as obstacles to reconciliation, not settlement (Bar‐Siman‐Tov, 1994a, b). What is new to this debate is that Netanyahu has managed to force the issue of recognition into the political arena and started to use the term reconciliation, which implies a Palestinian recognition of Israel as a Jewish State.…”

Section: Features Of Reconciliation As Israel Wants It From Palestiniansmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Israeli negotiation strategy under Netanyahu: settlement without reconciliation

Mustafa

Ghanem

2013

International Journal of Conflict Management

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Purpose -This article aims to analyse the Israeli negotiation strategy in reference to the theoretical frameworks of reconciliation and settlement. It focuses on the Israeli-Palestinian negotiation experience over the past three years, or since Netanyahu was elected Prime Minister of the Israeli Government in 2009. Design/methodology/approach -Theoretical literature provides two hypothetical frameworks for resolution of conflicts: a political settlement; and reconciliation between parties to the conflict. This article argues that Israel's vision of conflict resolution effectively attempts to integrate both hypothetical frameworks by proposing a political settlement for Palestinians in return for obtaining reconciliation from them. To analyse this strategy, this article explores the Israeli political discourse over the past three years, as well as Israel's vision of the conflict resolution as is manifest in this discourse. Findings -The article argument is based on the indication that willingness of a party to reach a settlement is met with reconciliation from the other party to the conflict. A party's insistence on offering a settlement and attaining reconciliation is associated with power relations between both parties. To maintain its powerful position, the stronger party usually demands reconciliation from the weaker party, at the same time presenting a settlement that implies a political, not moral, recognition of the weaker party with a view to dispossess it from its moral logic in the conflict. Originality/value -An assessment of the Israeli political discourse over the past three years indicates that Israel is implementing a compound negotiation strategy to resolve the conflict. The strategy entails settlement and reconciliation components. Israel wishes to deal with Palestinians through a political settlement. On the other hand, Israel wants the Palestinians to deal with it through the reconciliation process.

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Section: Features Of Reconciliation As Israel Wants It From Palestiniansmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Israeli negotiation strategy under Netanyahu: settlement without reconciliation

Mustafa

Ghanem

2013

International Journal of Conflict Management

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“…From this point, the conflict had turned from a sporadic conflict against specific terror organizations, based mainly on concrete responses to terror attacks, into a conflict between two distinguished communities over vital national interests. It was now marked as an ethno‐communal conflict focusing not merely on territorial issues, but rather on national, ideational and communal ones (Bar‐Siman‐Tov, 1994, p. 87; Bar‐Tal, 1998a, p. 17).…”

Section: Conflict Societal Beliefs and Political Narratives – The Israeli Casementioning

confidence: 99%

(Re‐)telling societal beliefs

Mitrani

2013

International Journal of Conflict Management

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Purpose -This paper aims to explore if and how changes in social representations of conflict are designed and constructed in the formal political discourse. Design/methodology/approach -Taking a psycho-sociological approach and by relying on discourse analysis, it explores the discursive patterns used by the political leadership in order to legitimize either war or peace actions. Through the analysis of speeches that were given by Israeli prime ministers in the Knesset and in the context of warfare or peace processes, the paper traces changes in the historical narratives that frame Israel's cluster of societal beliefs in regards to the conflict, and further explores how these are being re-narrated in light of the process of transition to peace. Findings -The paper argues that both warfare and peace processes, representing the extreme options available in conflict, require broad public recruitment and immense rhetorical efforts on behalf of the political leadership to reason and legitimatize actions through the formal political discourse. The findings highlight the ways through which the political leadership in Israel justifies its actions and attempts to enlist public support as a prism to trace how societal beliefs have been narrated for the purpose of justifying warfare, and how the same beliefs are re-narrated to justify conflict resolution. Originality/value -The paper strives to shed light on the role played by the interplay between political discourse and societal beliefs in the context of transition to peace, and thus advances understandings of the linkage between internal processes and external circumstances, as mitigated by political discourse, in the context of conflict and conflict resolution.

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“…For instance, some scholars argue that the cohesion of political coalitions on both sides (Mordechai, 1991;Slater, 1997Slater, -1998 affects the outcomes of negotiations. Others focus on the preferences and personal characteristics of key negotiating partners: their willingness to be intransigent or conciliatory in negotiations (Brams and Doherty, 1993;Kriesberg, 1987), their ability to find and agree upon creative, feasible solutions (Khalidi, 1995;Reuveny, 1999;Slater, 1991;Yorke, 1990;Zartman, 1997), and the commitment of key actors --including third parties --to conclude successful negotiations (Bannerman, 1992(Bannerman, -1993Bar-Siman-Tov, 1994; Kriesberg, 1987;Mandell, 1996;Slater, 1991 and1997-98). Finally, yet other scholars argue that key factors lie outside of the official negotiation partners.…”

Section: Negotiationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Coalitions and Conflict: the Case of the Palestinian-Israeli Negotiations Over the West Bank

Organski

2002

Conflict Management and Peace Science

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This paper examines the relative influence of leaders and coalitions in the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations over the West Bank. It uses an Expected Utiliiy model in conjunction with empirical analysis of the negotiations from 1993 to 2000 to consider how the leadership and coalition changes affected the potemial settlements under Rabin, Peres, Netanyahu. and Barak. It draws two important conclusions: First, negotiations are better understood as the outcome of the domestic struggles between moderates and radicals on each side than as the simple interplay between leaders and their coalitions on both sides. In the case at hand, the domestic struggle between moderate and radical Israelis over their negotiating position and the similar struggle between moderate and radical Palestinians has affected the course of negotiations more than the personal preferences and coalitions of each subsequent Israeli administration. Thus, although Barak and Rabin had very similar preferences and coalitions, the course of negotiations under these administrations differed dramatically. Second, the analysis suggests that right wing governments may make significant progress in negotiations, particularly when their negotiating partner is committed to the pracess. Ironically, had he remained in power. Netanyalru would likely have come to a settlement, gaining more Palestinian concessions than his Labor counierparts. Empirical evidence from the course of negotiations supports the model's findings.Negotiations seeking to end the long-standing conflicts between political rivals are among the most important political processes in the world today. Policy makers, scholars and the general public pay enormous attention to negotiations between enduring rivals--whether between competing groups within the same state or rivals across states. The prospects for peace between Palestinians and Israelis, Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland, and warring factions in Bosnia and Somalia take center stage. Yet, we have very little understanding of when real settlements are possible or what steps policy makers can take to push the processes forward. Attention focuses on the extent to which the &dquo;political will&dquo; or power of various leaders will help sustain negotiations, the likelihood that domestic constraints at UNIV OF NORTH DAKOTA on May 30, 2015 cmp.sagepub.com Downloaded from

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The Arab—Israeli Conflict: Learning Conflict Resolution

Cited by 22 publications

References 10 publications

The Israeli negotiation strategy under Netanyahu: settlement without reconciliation

The Israeli negotiation strategy under Netanyahu: settlement without reconciliation

(Re‐)telling societal beliefs

Coalitions and Conflict: the Case of the Palestinian-Israeli Negotiations Over the West Bank

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