Coalitions and Conflict: the Case of the Palestinian-Israeli Negotiations Over the West Bank

Abstract

This paper examines the relative influence of leaders and coalitions in the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations over the West Bank. It uses an Expected Utiliiy model in conjunction with empirical analysis of the negotiations from 1993 to 2000 to consider how the leadership and coalition changes affected the potemial settlements under Rabin, Peres, Netanyahu. and Barak. It draws two important conclusions: First, negotiations are better understood as the outcome of the domestic struggles between moderates and radicals on each side than as the simple interplay between leaders and their coalitions on both sides. In the case at hand, the domestic struggle between moderate and radical Israelis over their negotiating position and the similar struggle between moderate and radical Palestinians has affected the course of negotiations more than the personal preferences and coalitions of each subsequent Israeli administration. Thus, although Barak and Rabin had very similar preferences and coalitions, the course of negotiations under these administrations differed dramatically. Second, the analysis suggests that right wing governments may make significant progress in negotiations, particularly when their negotiating partner is committed to the pracess. Ironically, had he remained in power. Netanyalru would likely have come to a settlement, gaining more Palestinian concessions than his Labor counierparts. Empirical evidence from the course of negotiations supports the model's findings.Negotiations seeking to end the long-standing conflicts between political rivals are among the most important political processes in the world today. Policy makers, scholars and the general public pay enormous attention to negotiations between enduring rivals--whether between competing groups within the same state or rivals across states. The prospects for peace between Palestinians and Israelis, Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland, and warring factions in Bosnia and Somalia take center stage. Yet, we have very little understanding of when real settlements are possible or what steps policy makers can take to push the processes forward. Attention focuses on the extent to which the &dquo;political will&dquo; or power of various leaders will help sustain negotiations, the likelihood that domestic constraints at UNIV OF NORTH DAKOTA on May 30, 2015 cmp.sagepub.com Downloaded from