The cognitive conflict model described by Hammond (1965) is based on the premise that cognitive differences may cause serious interpersonal conflicts, even in the extreme case of persons who are working together to attain a mutually desired goal. Empirical support for this premise has been obtained in several studies showing effects of cognitive differences upon subsequent conflict, learning, and compromise (e.g., Rappoport, 1965; Todd, Hammond, and Wilkins, 1965; Hammond, Todd, Wilkins, and Mitchell, 1967; Hammond, Bonaiuto, et al., 1967).However, these studies have all been experiments in which persons previously trained in the laboratory to think differently about an uncertain task disagree when they must make joint decisions concerning the task. If the cognitive conflict model is to serve as anything more than a laboratory analogue, it must be determined whether socially-induced ( i. e., &dquo;natural&dquo;) cognitive differences generate the same conflict phenomena as laboratory-induced (i.e., &dquo;artificial&dquo;) cognitive differences. This problem is investigated here by comparing the performances of S-pairs characterized by socially-induced cognitive differences and similarities with respect to a racial integration judgment task.The same problem was recently studied by Summers (1968). He also selected and compared S-pairs who thought differently and similarly about a racial issue. But, as we shall note in more detail later, his work primarily concerned the effects of rewards and instructions on conflict resolution. The present work is entirely concerned with appropriate methodology for studying conflict as a function of socially-induced cognitive differences.
DesignThe study is based on selecting pairs of Ss whose thinking about racial integration is (a) different (negatively related), (b) similar (positively related), and (c) in-