The base-rate fallacy: Contrasting processes and outcomes of group and individual judgment

Argote, Linda; Devadas, R.; Melone, Nancy Paule

doi:10.1016/0749-5978(90)90034-7

Cited by 66 publications

(48 citation statements)

References 20 publications

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“…Yet, such comparisons have been relatively inconclusive: sometimes groups outperform individuals, sometimes their performance is comparable, and sometimes individuals outperform groups. For instance, using the very same probability judgment paradigm, Argote, Seabright, and Dyer (1986) showed that group judgments are less affected by base-rate information than judgments made by individuals; whereas Argote, Devadas, and Melone (1990) showed that sometimes group judgments are more sensitive to base-rates than individual judgments. This not-isolated example of mixed findings points to the fact that the search for a single answer to the question of whether N þ 1 heads are indeed better than one (see Hill, 1982) may be less productive, both socially and empirically, than the search for answers to the questions of when and why groups perform differently (i.e., better and worse) than individuals (see, e.g., Broadbeck & Greitemeyer, 2000;Kerr et al, 1996 for similar reasoning).…”

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confidence: 94%

Falsification cueing in collective reasoning: example of the Wason selection task

Augustinova

2008

Euro J Social Psych

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This paper focuses on the effectiveness of groups, as opposed to individuals, in benefiting from falsification cueing in solving the Wason selection task. Consistent with the idea that groups use information that often individuals fail to use, Experiment 1 showed that groups (but not individuals) that received falsification cueing focused more on cue-consistent evidence in their reasoning. Experiments 2 and 3 showed that the increment in focus on cue-consistent evidence is moderated by the distribution of the falsification cue within a group. Finally, Experiment 3 demonstrated that the cue distribution affects collective focus on cue-consistent evidence through the content of the group discussion, namely through mentioning the cue during the discussion. Copyright # 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.The comparison between individuals and groups in cognitive and behavioral performance has been a research tradition in both social and industrial-organizational psychology (see, e.g., Hill, 1982; Kerr, MacCoun, & Kramer, 1996 for reviews). Yet, such comparisons have been relatively inconclusive: sometimes groups outperform individuals, sometimes their performance is comparable, and sometimes individuals outperform groups. For instance, using the very same probability judgment paradigm, Argote, Seabright, and Dyer (1986) showed that group judgments are less affected by base-rate information than judgments made by individuals; whereas Argote, Devadas, and Melone (1990) showed that sometimes group judgments are more sensitive to base-rates than individual judgments. This not-isolated example of mixed findings points to the fact that the search for a single answer to the question of whether N þ 1 heads are indeed better than one (see Hill, 1982) may be less productive, both socially and empirically, than the search for answers to the questions of when and why groups perform differently (i.e., better and worse) than individuals (see, e.g., Broadbeck & Greitemeyer, 2000;Kerr et al., 1996 for similar reasoning). In this spirit, the present paper examines when groups perform differently from individuals in the Wason selection task (Wason, 1966) and attempts to shed some light on why any such differences occur. Since the Wason task was devised to assess how people engage in hypothesis testing, specifically when the hypothesis under consideration is supported by confirming evidence (Wason, 1968b), the cognitive processes involved map on to those that jurors, board members, and other decision-makers employ everyday in individual and, even more frequently, in group settings.In order to address the question of why groups perform differently from individuals, significant attention has recently been devoted to how groups process information (Hinsz, Tindale, & Vollrath, 1997;Larson & Christensen, 1993). Although largely modeled on individual models of information processing, resulting conceptualizations have identified many specificities of cognitive processes in interpersonal and group contexts. One key factor is that information p...

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confidence: 94%

Falsification cueing in collective reasoning: example of the Wason selection task

Augustinova

2008

Euro J Social Psych

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“…For example, groups are more susceptible to the base-rate fallacy than are individuals. 141 Another line of work shows that when groups make decisions under uncertainty (such as when physicians confer on a diagnosis or treatment option), they are more likely to discuss information shared among the members of the group than they are to discuss information known by only one member of the group. 142 Another important area for future research is an integration of the work on health communication with that on risk perception and decision making.…”

Section: Limitations and Directions For Future Researchmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cancer Risk Elicitation and Communication: Lessons from the Psychology of Risk Perception

Klein

Stefanek

2007

CA: A Cancer Journal for Clinicians

146

129

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Cancer risk perceptions are a key predictor of risk-reduction practices, health behaviors, and processing of cancer information. Nevertheless, patients and the general public (as well as health care providers) exhibit a number of errors and biases in the way they think about risk, such that their risk perceptions and decisions deviate greatly from those prescribed by normative decision models and by experts in risk assessment. For example, people are more likely to engage in screening behaviors such as mammography when faced with loss-based messages than gain-framed messages, and they often ignore the base rate of a given disease when assessing their own risk of obtaining this disease. In this article, we review many of the psychological processes that underlie risk perception and discuss how these processes lead to such deviations. Among these processes are difficulties with use of numerical information (innumeracy), cognitive processes (eg, use of time-saving heuristics), motivational factors (eg, loss and regret aversion), and emotion. We conclude with suggestions for future research in the area, as well as implications for improving the elicitation and communication of personal cancer risk.

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“…Cox and Hayne (2006) and Sutter et al (2008) even find that groups more easily fall prey to the winner's curse in common value auctions than individuals do. Moreover, Argote et al (1990) find that group discussions amplify the base rate fallacy and Kerr et al (1999) show that in many cases individual biases are amplified in groups. On the other hand, report that group decisions are closer to the rational equilibrium prediction in a centipede game, Cooper and Kagel (2005) show that groups act more strategically in signaling games and Sutter (2007) shows that groups exhibit less myopic loss aversion than individuals.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The tragedy of the commons revisited: The importance of group decision-making

Gillet

Schram

Sonnemans

2009

Journal of Public Economics

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Abstract:We use a laboratory experiment to compare the way groups and individuals behave in an inter-temporal common pool dilemma. The experimental design distinguishes between a non-strategic problem where players (individuals or groups of three) make decisions without interaction and a strategic part where players harvest from a common pool. This allows us to correct for differences between individuals and groups in the quality of decisions when testing for differences in competitiveness. Group decisions are either made by majority rule or unanimity. The results show that groups are less myopic than individuals (i.e., they make qualitatively better decisions) but that they are more competitive than individuals when placed in a strategic setting. The net result for groups deciding by majority rule is that they make less efficient decisions in the strategic game than individuals do. We are able to show that this is caused by the median voter departing from her original preference in early periods with a shrinking pool. When groups have to make unanimous decisions they start playing the strategic game more efficiently then individuals do, but they rapidly become more competitive with repetition of the game.

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The base-rate fallacy: Contrasting processes and outcomes of group and individual judgment

Cited by 66 publications

References 20 publications

Falsification cueing in collective reasoning: example of the Wason selection task

Falsification cueing in collective reasoning: example of the Wason selection task

Cancer Risk Elicitation and Communication: Lessons from the Psychology of Risk Perception

The tragedy of the commons revisited: The importance of group decision-making

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