The Balkans after Iraq … Iraq after the Balkans. Who's Next?

Abstract

The Balkans and Iraq have become emblematic features of the post-cold war geography of international relations. However, by concentrating on the current ruptures in the Euro-Atlantic community, most commentators: (i) neglect the macro-historical tendency of the US towards unilateralism in response to 'existential threats' and to multilateral approaches whenever and wherever the sense of urgency is not pressing; and (ii) overlook the fact that the Iraq crisis is an aberration in an otherwise persisting transatlantic relationship of co-operation. It can be argued that an exploration of the externally-driven processes of order-promotion in the region indicates that the Iraq crisis did not impact dramatically on the role of either the EU or NATO.This is because the Balkans remains an area of co-operation between the transatlantic partners as a result of their reaction to the Kosovo crisis.

The end of China’s romance with Central and Eastern Europe

“…Such mutual disinterest has informed the better part of the first two decades following the fall of the Berlin Wall. To the extent that they did, most CEE states began to engage with China on an ad hoc basis and invariably motivated by an opportunistic ‘realpolitik’ (Kavalski, 2005). In this respect, it is China’s attention to the CEE region in 2012 that has very much set the stage for its perception in the context of the current pandemic (Brinza, 2019).…”

China’s Belt and Road Initiative in Central and Eastern Europe

“…Guidelines are being updated at every subsequent summit of the "16+1". At the same time, the Bucharest Guidelines sought to align the "16+1" with the broader objectives of the BRI (McCullock and Kavalski 2005). The 2014 Summit in Belgrade (Serbia) reinforced the centrality of the initiative to the BRI and reiterated Beijing's interests in closer cooperation with the CEE region.…”

“…This Chinese stance is in accordance with its long-standing opposition to what it calls "splittism"the violent cessation of a territory from the rest of a country (Heath and Gray 2018;Zolkos and Kavalski 2007). In this respect, China's support for Serbia's sovereignty is not merely strategic opportunism, but also has to do with Beijing's commitment to the inviolability of national sovereignty and non-interference in the domestic affairs of states (Fierke and Antonio-Alfonso 2018;Kavalski 2005). China's insistence on sovereignty reflects a normative strategy for nurturing mutual expectations premised on respect for each other's integrity.…”

Whom to Follow? Central Asia between the EU and China

“…A number of analysts have claimed that the EU's external relations developed procedurally, in response to the crises in the Balkans (especially, the wars of Yugoslav succession). Yet, despite the tragedies (in particular the Srebrenica massacre of July 1995), for the better part of the 1990s the EU advanced in the region through ad hoc and mostly humanitarian-aid-type of measures (Kavalski 2005). At the same time, Brussels had already involved the countries from the so-called Central and East European (CEE) states into bilateral contractual relations for prospective (albeit distant) accession.…”