The Balance of Power in International History

Abstract

Many observers have recently noted that the international system is evolving into a multipolar world. At the same time, the notion of balance of power is being severely criticized for its vagueness and inconsistency. Seven empirically testable propositions which exemplify refined and narrowed notions of balance of power are reviewed and analyzed in this paper. These propositions, authored by one of four major approaches to the multipolar system: (1) the rules of a theoretical balance of power system, (2) the functioning of alliances, (3) historical systemic periodization, and (4) the application of structural balance theory to the international system. The Situational Analysis Project provided the data for testing these propositions over the first twelve years of the "Bismarckian system," 1870 through 1881. The propositions did not hold up well under detailed testing. The rules of the balance of power system were violated—in particular, an "ingratiation effect" was found in place of the balance-restoring mechanism; alliances led to a lessening of cooperation and attention between allies; and historical periodization was found to be inaccurate. The findings, however, did support the fundamental assumption underlying the structural balance theory. Since the future may be quite like the nineteenth century in terms of structure, a reevaluation of the Bismarckian system is not an irrelevant exercise but rather an inquiry into the functioning of a system we may actually have to operate. AUTHORS' NOTE: The authors wish to express deepest thanks to Professor Richard Rosecrance for his generous encouragement, support, and cntical stimulation.

What Is the Enemy of My Enemy? Causes and Consequences of Imbalanced International Relations, 1816–2001

“…Abstract discussions of the “enemy of my enemy” phenomenon pervade the literature; yet few empirical studies examined whether states opt for balanced relations. Healy and Stein (1973) examined data on diplomatic interactions over the 1871–80 period and showed that the Germany‐Austria‐Russia (G‐A‐R) triad fluctuated between balanced and imbalanced relations but converged towards balance in the late 1870s. They also find that imbalanced relations are more likely to move towards balance than are balanced relations to move towards imbalance.…”

“…Moreover, major powers are particularly concerned about balancing power. Consequently their behavior frequently shifts from diplomacy to conflict and vice versa, thus generating behavioral imbalances (Healy and Stein 1973; McDonald and Rosecrance 1985). This implies that major powers may exhibit a higher frequency of imbalanced relations than minor states.…”

Alignment, Structural Balance, and International Conflict in the Middle East, 1948-1978

“…By representing psychological relations with graphs, Cartwright and Harary made it possible to generalize the relational balance theory to a wide range of situations such as sociometric structures, communication networks, international relations, and other aspects of social systems. Since then, there have been quite a few attempts to apply the theory of relational balance and the approach of graph theory to study international alignments (e.g., Harary 1961Harary , 1977Doreian 1968;Hart 1974aHart , 1974bHealy and Stein 1973;Moore 1978Moore , 1979McDonald and Rosecrance 1985;and Lai 1995). Both the theoretical and empirical studies mentioned above agree that much like the constraints of the distribution of power capability, the tendencies for relational balance also work as structural forces acting on the actors and the friend-enemy alignment relations between them.…”

The international system and the use of weapons of mass destruction

“…Findings pointed out first, that there is a tendency towards equilibrium and stability in multipolarity; second, that the alignment of two or more states with each other heightens the opposition of others and enhances the risk of war; and third, that interactions between the alliance members and outside members increase. 58 The emergence of multipolarity has spurred some scholars to examine earlier periods of similar system structure. Work on alliance formation has concluded that while democratic states are not particularly less inclined to go to war than other forms of government, they are disinclined to go to war against each other.…”