The Arab Spring: What's in it for Us?

Freudenstein, Roland

doi:10.1007/s12290-011-0172-4

Cited by 4 publications

(3 citation statements)

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“…The EU, however, has remained steadfast in its claims that MENA civil societies have been striving to achieve global standards of democracy and freedom (e.g. Freudenstein, 2011). As a result, recognition of the heterogeneous and multilocal nature of the uprisings, as well as their causes, has only slowly begun to translate into serious ENP reform (Balfour et al, 2016).…”

Section: Arguementioning

confidence: 99%

Spatial imaginaries and selective in/visibility: Mediterranean neighbourhood and the European Union’s engagement with civil society after the ‘Arab Spring’

Bürkner

Scott

2018

European Urban and Regional Studies

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As part of a repertoire of the European Union’s (EU’s) geopolitical practices, the imaginary of Mediterranean Neighbourhood is a means with which to manage dissonance between the EU’s self-image as a normative power, changing political situations in the region and the Realpolitik of security. We argue that this also involved a ‘politics of in/visibility’ that promotes democratization and social modernization through structured cooperation while engaging selectively with local stakeholders. In directing attention to EU readings of and responses to the ‘Arab Spring’, we indicate how both a simplification of the issues at stake and highly selective political framings of local civil societies have operated in tandem. Drawing on a review of recent literature on civil society activism in the southern Mediterranean, we specifically deal with Eurocentric appropriations of civil society as a force for change and as a central element in the construction of the Mediterranean Neighbourhood. EU support for South Mediterranean civil society appears to be targeted at specific actors with whom the EU deems it can work: apart from national elites these include well-established, professionalized non-governmental organizations, and westernized elements of national civil societies. As a result, recognition of the heterogeneous and multilocal nature of the uprisings, as well as their causes, has only marginally translated into serious European Neighbourhood Policy reform. We suggest that an inclusive focus on civil society would reveal Neighbourhood as a contact zone and dialogic space, rather than a project upon which the EU is (rather unsuccessfully) attempting to superimpose a unifying narrative of EU-led modernization.

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Section: Arguementioning

confidence: 99%

Spatial imaginaries and selective in/visibility: Mediterranean neighbourhood and the European Union’s engagement with civil society after the ‘Arab Spring’

Bürkner

Scott

2018

European Urban and Regional Studies

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“…The drama has been staged as a succession of overlapping, sometimes intersecting crises. The aggravating Eurozone crisis, with Mediterranean member states being the primary losers (Statham and Trenz 2015); recent geopolitical interventions by the European Union and its member states into the Eastern and Southern Neighbourhood, mainly by support of US actions during the Arab Spring (Freudenstein 2011); direct political interventions into the Ukraine conflict (Sakwa 2015); the following imposing of sanctions against Russia (Duke and Gebhard 2017; Orenstein and Kelemen 2017); inconsistent political positioning towards the Syrian civil war, between humanitarian action, sanctions against Syria and permissiveness of behind-the-scene arms delivery by EU members to combattants other than Russia and the Syrian government (Turkmani and Haid 2016); and finally the ongoing refugee drama: they all raised major controversies about the rationality and viability of the European project. Especially the Ukraine crisis and shady prospects of further eastward enlargement had a mobilizing effect on EU-wide debates about the future position of the European Union in international politics (see Cadier 2018; David and Romanova 2015; Haukkala 2015).…”

Section: Crisis Dynamism As a Trigger Of Euroscepticismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Europeanisation versus Euroscepticism: Do Borders Matter?

Bürkner

2020

Geopolitics

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Several overlapping crises which affected the EU during the past ten years have recently aggravated. Especially the progressing refugee crisis, the persisting financial crisis and geopolitical turmoil in the EU's neighbourhood contributed to the rise of anti-EU movements and diverse articulations of Euroscepticism. Although public opinion and mainstream political analysis have easily identified right-wing populism as one of the most important drivers, it is still doubtful if it can be equated with Euroscepticism without further ado. To date it is by no means clear how and where Euroscepticism exactly originates.

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“…In addition, the wave evokes not just an intensifying force (as it builds toward the shore), like the cascade, but also the subsequent discharge and fading (as it breaks) that characterizes each protest surge and, conceivably, each specific protest within it. This indicates a momentum quite different from a cyclical return to the beginning, one that is vulnerable to counter-measures (wave breakers or breakwaters) and subject to highly variable outcomes; the wave may fizzle out, but it may also overwhelm and alter the landscape or cause profound damage, as in the case of a tsunami, to which the Arab Spring has been repeatedly likened, mostly by those framing it as a failure (Freudenstein 2011;Bradley 2012;Gartenstein-Ross and Vassefi 2012;Haseeb 2012). Finally, the wave, through its capacity to travel across vast distances, connotes geographical expansion more readily than the cycle (associated with circumscription) or the cascade (invoking the vertical movement of a waterfall).…”

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confidence: 99%