The Analysis of Knowing

Shope, Robert K.

doi:10.1007/978-1-4020-1986-9_8

Cited by 27 publications

(11 citation statements)

References 17 publications

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“…For a review of literature during the first two decades after Gettier's paper appeared, see Shope, (1983). For more recent work in this tradition, see Plantinga (1993a) and(1993b) as well as the follow-up collection of papers in Kvanvig (1996).…”

Section: The Normativity Problemmentioning

confidence: 99%

Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions

Weinberg

Nichols

Stich

2012

Collected Papers, Volume 2

130

160

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Section: The Normativity Problemmentioning

confidence: 99%

Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions

Weinberg

Nichols

Stich

2012

Collected Papers, Volume 2

130

160

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“…This familiar phenomenon explains why proposals are so much easier ruled out than confirmed (see Shope 1983). It might also explain why we are confident of having attained something approaching comprehensive clarity with respect to the notions of just a select few terms.…”

Section: Notions and How We Evaluate Philosophical Counterfactualsmentioning

confidence: 96%

Philosophical Thought Experiments as Excercises in Conceptual Analysis

Nimtz¹

2010

Grazer Philos Stud

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SummaryIn the paper, I defend the viability and importance of conceptual analysis to philosophical inquiry. My argument proceeds in two steps. In a first step, I argue that we rely on the notions guiding how we do and would apply our terms in order to evaluate the counterfactual conditionals we find at the heart of philosophical thought-experiments. In a second step, I argue that our notions determine what the relevant terms mean in our mouth. In order to defend the resulting neodescriptivist semantics, I put forth an epistemic argument for descriptivism -the argument from communication. I conclude that philosophical thought experiments are exercises in conceptual analysis.

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“…This third class of defeaters is intended to rule out Gettier-type cases. (See Gettier (1963) and Shope (1983).) In what follows, however, I shall focus only on doxastic and normative defeaters.…”

Section: IVmentioning

confidence: 98%

Testimony and the Infant/Child Objection

Lackey

2005

Philos Stud

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One of the central problems afflicting reductionism in the epistemology of testimony is the apparent fact that infants and small children are not cognitively capable of having the inductively based positive reasons required by this view. Since non-reductionism does not impose a requirement of this sort, it is thought to avoid this problem and is therefore taken to have a significant advantage over reductionism. In this paper, however, I argue that if this objection undermines reductionism, then a variant of it similarly undermines non-reductionism. Thus, considerations about the cognitive capacities of infants and small children do not effectively discriminate between these two competing theories of testimonial justification.

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The Analysis of Knowing

Cited by 27 publications

References 17 publications

Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions

Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions

Philosophical Thought Experiments as Excercises in Conceptual Analysis

Testimony and the Infant/Child Objection

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