The affective control of thought: Malleable, not fixed.

Abstract

Despite decades of research demonstrating a dedicated link between positive and negative affect and specific cognitive processes, not all research is consistent with this view. We present a new overarching theoretical account as an alternative-one that can simultaneously account for prior findings, generate new predictions, and encompass a wide range of phenomena. According to our proposed affect-as-cognitive-feedback account, affective reactions confer value on accessible information processing strategies (e.g., global vs. local processing) and other responses, goals, concepts, and thoughts that happen to be accessible at the time. This view underscores that the relationship between affect and cognition is not fixed but, instead, is highly malleable. That is, the relationship between affect and cognitive processing can be altered, and often reversed, by varying the mental context in which it is experienced. We present evidence that supports this account, along with implications for specific affective states and other subjective experiences. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2014 APA, all rights reserved).

The Role of Dysphoria in Social Thinking and Behaviour

“…The target article suggested that the overall pattern of results can be best explained in term of a dual‐process model that predicts that a positive mood recruits a more top–down, assimilative, internally focused processing style, whereas a negative mood promotes more attentive, accommodative, and externally focused thinking (e.g., Bless & Fiedler, ; Fiedler, ). Palermo suggests that “not all data fits neatly within these theories,” and refers to Hunsinger, Isbell, and Clore's () affect‐as‐cognitive‐feedback model as an alternative. Hunsinger, Isbell, and Clore (, p. 220) propose that “affect confers its value on whatever cognitive inclinations are most accessible in a given situation… /in terms of this/malleable mood effects hypothesis, …happy moods should maintain and unhappy moods should inhibit situationally dominant thinking styles.” This idea is closely related to early suggestions by Martin () that the informational value of affective states is mostly context‐dependent.…”

“…We should also note that in several experiments here and elsewhere, the data not only support clear‐cut mood effects on memory, judgments, and social behaviours, but there is also clear evidence for the predicted processing differences in terms of processing latency and memory data. The Hunsinger et al (, ) model has difficulty in explaining the often‐repeated finding that positive mood produces faster and less attentive processing with poorer memory, while negative mood results in slower, more attentive processing in improved memory across different tasks and measures (Forgas, ; Forgas & Eich, ). On balance, then, we believe that the assimilation‐accommodation theory is currently the best fitting explanation for the evidence presented here.…”

When Affect Supports Cognitive Control – A Working Memory Perspective

“…The course of promotion self-regulation is dominated by positive mood, whereas prevention self-regulation -by negative mood (Amodio, Shah, Sigelman, Brazy, Harmon-Jones, 2004;Cunningham, Raye & Johnson, 2005;Summerville & Roese, 2008;Kolańczyk, Bąk & Roczniewska, 2013). Moreover, a positive affective background facilitates global and intuitive information processing, while its negative counterpart favors analytical and profound processing (Schwarz & Bless, 1991;Bless, Schwarz & Wieland, 1996;Jefferies, Smilek, Eich & Enns, 2008;Kappes, Oettinger, Maeyer & Maglio, 2011;Fredrickson & Branigan, 2005;Kolańczyk, 2011;Zadra, Clore, 2011;Huntsinger, Isbell & Clore, 2014). It comes as no surprise then that a "wandering mind is an unhappy mind," as expressed by Killingsworth and Gilbert (2010).…”

“…Emotions are responsible, for instance, for the occurrence of motivational tension, modulating the willingness to involve oneself in goals, determining which goals, along with associated content, are activated in working memory, or which content needs to be inhibited as irrelevant. Experimental results on the role of affect in cognitive processes lead to the patching of cognitive control approaches with individual observations (e.g., Glasler & Banaji, 1999;Kolańczyk & Pawłowska-Fusiara, 2002;Raymond, Fenske, & Westoby, 2005;Jefferies, Smilek, Eich & Enns, 2008;Huntsinger, Isbell, & Clore, 2014;Gotoh, Kikuchi, & Olofsson, 2010;Gasper & Hackenbracht, 2015;Schouppe et al, 2015) or collections of observations (Locke & Braver, 2008;Piotrowki & Wierzchoń, 2009). The critical mass of insight from such studies, carried out also in this laboratory, allows me to attempt to extend the concept of working memory with the most significant affective mechanisms supporting cognitive control.…”

Propositions toward the development of a psychological theory of thought

“…Currently, there are a great number of studies that deal with thought through investigation of applied problems (Bos et al, 2012;hart et al, 2013;Simonton, 2013;Smallwood, 2013;Thomas, 2013;Altmann et al, 2014;Becker et al, 2014;Bright & Feeney, 2014;gallagher et al, 2014;huntsinger et al, 2014;Logan et al, 2014;Avugos & Bar-Eli, 2015;Lohnberg & Altmaier, 2014). As such, we are witnessing the emergence of many singular reflections on thought content in different areas of psychology, especially in philosophical psychology, general psychology, cognitive psychology, the psychology of individual differences, clinical psychology, counseling psychology, and psycholinguistics.…”