The Addict in Us all

Abstract

In this paper, we contend that the psychology of addiction is similar to the psychology of ordinary, non-addictive temptation in important respects, and explore the ways in which these parallels can illuminate both addiction and ordinary action. The incentive salience account of addiction proposed by Robinson and Berridge (1–3) entails that addictive desires are not in their nature different from many of the desires had by non-addicts; what is different is rather the way that addictive desires are acquired, which in turn affects their strength. We examine these “incentive salience” desires, both in addicts and non-addicts, contrasting them with more cognitive desires. On this account, the self-control challenge faced by addicted agents is not different in kind from that faced by non-addicted agents – though the two may, of course, differ greatly in degree of difficulty. We explore a general model of self-control for both the addict and the non-addict, stressing that self-control may be employed at three different stages, and examining the ways in which it might be strengthened. This helps elucidate a general model of intentional action.

Self-deception as affective coping. An empirical perspective on philosophical issues

“…The previously mentioned effect of dopamine on attention, i.e. that dopamine comes with hypersalience of cues, seems also present in non-addicted people (Dill & Holton, 2014). Similarly, hallucinations and delusions in psychiatric diseases like schizophrenia strongly involve an increase in dopaminergic transmission (Os & Kapur, 2009).…”

Dual-System Theory and the Role of Consciousness in Intentional Action

“…Further, it is questionable that all desires are generated by System 1 and that the endorsement of desires is always due to System 2. Philosophers have long noted that many of our desires appear to be reason-responsive, and there is now a considerable amount of empirical evidence in support of this view (see Dill & Holton 2014). Some desires simply vanish when one learns that the desired object is unattainable, or when one judges that something else would be better, for instance.…”

Rauschzustände: Risiken und Nebenwirkungen

“…Glutamat gesteuerte neuronale Netzwerke, die bspw. mit der bewussten Wahrnehmung, Realitäts, Impuls und Emo tionskontrolle, sowie Gedächtnis und Motivationsleistungen und Stressregulation befasst sind [20,21]. Als zentraler Angriffspunkt für Rauschdrogen gilt das hirneigene Belohnungssystem, das art und selbsterhaltene Verhaltensweisen wie die Erfüllung von Grundbedürfnissen, bspw.…”

“…Theorien über die Entstehung des Suchtverhaltens über Rauschdrogen stammt von Robinson und Berridge [20]. Diesbezüglich interessant ist auch die Arbeit von Dill & Holton [21], die bspw. andeutet, dass süchtige Anteile durchaus artimmanent sind.…”