Self-deception as affective coping. An empirical perspective on philosophical issues

Abstract

a b s t r a c tIn the philosophical literature, self-deception is mainly approached through the analysis of paradoxes. Yet, it is agreed that self-deception is motivated by protection from distress. In this paper, we argue, with the help of findings from cognitive neuroscience and psychology, that self-deception is a type of affective coping.First, we criticize the main solutions to the paradoxes of self-deception. We then present a new approach to self-deception. Self-deception, we argue, involves three appraisals of the distressing evidence: (a) appraisal of the strength of evidence as uncertain, (b) low coping potential and (c) negative anticipation along the lines of Damasio's somatic marker hypothesis. At the same time, desire impacts the treatment of flattering evidence via dopamine. Our main proposal is that self-deception involves emotional mechanisms provoking a preference for immediate reward despite possible long-term negative repercussions. In the last part, we use this emotional model to revisit the philosophical paradoxes.Published by Elsevier Inc.

Friend and foe? Self-deception in organisations

“…Pragmatic cognitive systems minimise cognitive and emotional overload by favouring heuristics over efforts to reconcile conflicting or novel information, and by prioritising error minimisation over error detection, rendering truth-seeking efforts a more infrequent undertaking. This suggests a relationship between pragmatic cognitive systems and self-deception, wherein individuals self-deceive to minimise the cognitive and emotional effort involved in challenging held beliefs (Lauria et al, 2016). The pragmatic cognitive systems theory is consistent with mainstream philosophical views of self-deception, which propose that individuals may hold opposing beliefs at different levels of depth, and commit to a given belief irrespective of its truth-value (Mele, 1997).…”

“…A view of self-deception as affective coping suggests that individuals eschew emotionally taxing evidence, and regulate evidence-seeking efforts, despite potential for long-term negative outcomes. When evidence contradicts a belief, and is seen as a threat to well-being, individuals engage in three types of appraisal (see Lauria et al, 2016). The first type consists of appraising evidence as ambiguous or not compelling enough to justify truth-seeking efforts.…”

“…Over time, they become increasingly identified with the organisation (Funkhouser and Barrett, 2016), and build confidence in their competence and social standing to sustain a positive view of self-in-role (Lopez and Fuxjager, 2012). We suggest that further research is needed to test the premise that a modicum of self-deception is necessary to ensure and sustain well-being, as it facilitates socialisation, identity development and positive coping (Biggane et al, 2016;Kreiner et al, 2015;Lauria et al, 2016):…”

The Effect of Negative Feedback on Positive Beliefs in Self-Deception

“…However, in reality, when self-deception appears, the sense of morality will fade (Tenbrunsel and Messick, 2004). Self-deception reduces the cognitive dissonance caused by unethical behavior (Lauria et al, 2016). Self-deception is regard as a strategy to deal with conflict between self-interest and moral standards (Batson et al, 1999; Tang et al, 2017, 2018).…”

“…The negative impact of self-deception on individuals makes it impossible for individuals to clearly recognize themselves, and self-deception is not conducive to long-term development. Self-deception has benefits from a short-term perspective, but there is a high price to pay in the long term (Chance et al, 2011; Lauria et al, 2016). Self-deception can be misleading for social policy and may cause disasters for groups and society; war is the most expensive price that we have paid, as illustrated by Hitler’s Nazi party (Trivers, 2000).…”