The Adaptive Dynamics of Turnout

Abstract

We present a dynamic model of turnout in which voters behavior in one election depends only on whether they voted in the last election and whether their party won. This assumption may be justified by assuming citizens satisfice or by assuming they adjust subjective beliefs about being pivotal in ways that depend on whether they voted and on the outcome of the election. Regardless of the individual-level mechanism, this assumption (prior participation and prior electoral outcome affect current turnout) has empirical support, and we show that it implies turnout dynamics that are in accord with observed dynamics in several countries. Thus, this assumption or something very much like it is a necessary feature of any model of turnout. The ensuing model meets a basic requirement of any turnout model, substantial steady-state turnout, and correctly predicts some counterintuitive dynamical features of aggregate turnout-including declining turnout despite close elections and nonmonotonic changes-following significant political events such as the (re)establishment of democracy or major wars.

Political efficacy and the persistence of turnout shocks

“…As further examples, the adaptive updating rule for the pivotal probability has also been used in the evolutionary model ofLandi and Sodini (2012), andCollins et al (2009) use an updating rule of the subjective belief of being pivotal that depends on whether a citizen has voted in the last election.…”

Entering Politics: General Self‐Efficacy and Voting Behavior Among Young People

“…This question holds special importance for our understanding of democratic participation because political behavior is characterized by inertia, or persistence; individuals who choose to participate early are more likely to participate throughout the life course. Evidence for this habitual quality is particularly strong in the case of voter turnout (Aldrich, Montgomery, & Wood, ; Collins, Kumar, & Bendor, ; Denny & Doyle, ; Gerber, Green, & Shachar, ; Green & Shachar, ; Plutzer, ). But understanding first‐time turnout, early in the life course, requires more of researchers than a simple application of typical turnout models.…”

An evolutionary analysis of turnout with conformist citizens

“…As elections for a particular seat alternate, typically, between 4 and 5 years, one might think that it is too naive for citizens to consider the past electoral result as a reliable source of information about the state variable. However, as Collins et al (2009) highlighted, there is an empirical evidence to support the assumption that prior voter turnout and electoral results (which are summarized by our state variable) affect current voters' decisions.…”

“…Unlike our model, where convergence to steady state is pretty fast, more elaborated dynamics can be achieved in models of bounded rationality learning where agents update their actions when aspiration levels are not met (Bendor et al, 2003) or when individuals' decision to vote depends on their past action and whether their favorite party has won the election (Collins et al, 2009). DeMichelis and Dhillon (2009) show that the only stable steady state in Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983) and Palfrey and Rosenthal (1985) involves low turnout.…”