The present study analyses the dynamics of a nonlinear Cournot duopoly with managerial delegation and bounded rational players. Problems concerning strategic delegation (based on relative performance evaluations) have recently received in depth attention in both the theoretical and empirical industrial economics literatures. In this paper, we take a dynamic view of this problem and assume that the owners of both firms hire a manager and delegate output decisions to him. Each manager receives a fixed salary plus a bonus offered in a publicly observable contract. The bonus entitled to the manager hired by the owner of every firm is based on relative (profit) performance. Managers of both firms may collude or compete. In such a context, we find, in either cases of collusion and low degree of competition, that synchronised dynamics takes place. However, when the degree of competition increases the dynamics can undergo symmetry-breaking bifurcations that may cause relevant global phenomena. In particular, on-off intermittency and blow-out bifurcations are observed for several parameter values. Moreover, coexistence of attractors may also occur. The global behaviour of the noninvertible map is investigated through the study of the transverse Lyapunov exponent and the folding action of the critical curves of the map. These phenomena are impossible under profit maximisation.
Empirical studies have documented a decline in indicators of social participation in the last decades. The responsibility of social disengagement has been often attributed to pervasive busyness and the rising pressure of time. In this paper we argue that computer-mediated interaction, and particularly online networking, can help mitigate this downward trend. We develop a logical framework for assessing the role of the internet in the evolution of social participation. We analyze an economy where agents can develop their social interactions through two main modes of participation, one encompassing both online networking and face to face interactions, and another solely based on physical encounters. We study the interdependence between the rise in the pressure of time and the variation in the relative performance of the two strategies of participation.
This paper extends the classical repeated duopoly model with quantity-setting firms of Bischi et al. (1998) by assuming that production of goods is subject to some gestation lags but exchanges take place continuously on the market. The model is expressed in the form of differential equations with discrete delays. By using some recent mathematical techniques and numerical experiments, results show some dynamic phenomena that cannot be observed when delays are absent. In addition, depending on the extent of time delays and inertia, synchronisation failure can arise even in the event of homogeneous firms.
We develop a dynamic model to analyze the sources and the evolution of social participation and social capital in a growing economy characterized by exogenous technical progress. Starting from the assumption that the well-being of agents basically depends on material and relational goods, we show that the best-case scenarios hold when technology and social capital both support just one of the two productions at the expenses of the other. However, trajectories are possible where technology and social interaction balance one another in fostering the growth of both the social and the private sector of the economy. Along such tracks, technology may play a crucial role in supporting a "socially sustainable" economic growth.
This paper analyses the dynamics of a nonlinear Cournot duopoly with general isoelastic demand (quasi-linear preferences) andquantity-setting firms that have incomplete information about the market demand. Unlike existing papers, we propose a modelwhere the price elasticity of demand is different from one. This causes interesting local and global dynamic events that cannot beobserved in the case of unit-elastic demand and homogeneous players. In particular, the global behaviour of the map is studiedthrough the critical curves technique, and numerical simulations show coexistence of attractors, coordination failures and complexstructures of the basins of attraction
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