The Accuracy of Post-Negotiation Estimates of the Other Negotiator's Payoff

Overcoming judgmental biases in negotiations: A scenario-based survey analysis on third party direct intervention

“…Arunachalam, Dilla, Shelley, & Chan, 1998;Lewicki et al, 1992;Raiffa et al, 2002;Sebenius, 1992). Parties showed the fixed-pie error along the negotiation process, which, as predicted, had an effect on the perception of fairness (e.g., Mumpower, Sheffield, Darling, & Miller, 2004;Patton & Balakrishnan, 2010;Thompson & Hastie, 1990;Thompson & Loewenstein, 1992). Thus, the TPDI's action in the case study involved framing techniques to de-bias negotiators.…”

“…This result is consistent the fact that values in the trait of extraversion have been found to be negatively correlated with the perceptions of information fairness and creating value. Indeed, a lower level of perception of fairness has been found to be a predictor for impasse in negotiation (Mumpower et al, 2004;Thompson & Hastie, 1990;Thompson & Loewenstein, 1992).…”

Fair, Efficient and Envy-Free Bargaining: An Experimental Test of the Brams-Taylor Adjusted Winner Mechanism

“…While no tests have been done comparing this mechanism with unstructured bargaining using a common set of bargaining data, the efficiencies achieved in all three information conditions with the AW mechanism are much larger than those usually reported for unstructured bargaining on analogous data sets. For example, in a typical two issue integrative negotiation, Mumpower et al (2004) report efficiencies on the order of two-thirds of those that subjects achieved using the AW in this study (as reported in Table 1). Likewise, in a series of two person face-toface negotiation simulations involving issues that are analogous to the 'objects' in our experiments, Neale and Northcraft (1986) and Bazerman et al (1985) report that subjects typically capture considerably less of the potential gains.…”

Learning about preferences in electronic negotiations – A volume-based measurement method

“…Many negotiators indeed start negotiations under the fixed sum error, but it could also be shown that during negotiations, learning takes places and the extent of this error is reduced over time. Furthermore, that study, as well as several later studies (Thompson, 1991;Thompson and DeHarpport, 1994;Arunachalam and Dilla, 1995;Mumpower et al, 2004) showed that in negotiations where the parties learn more about each other's preferences, the joint outcome at the end of the negotiation is higher.…”

“…The method used in these studies to measure knowledge about preferences was put into question by Mumpower et al (2004), who distinguished between the ''Payoff schedule estimation method" used in the earlier studies, and another method called ''Holistic estimation method". In the second method, subjects are directly asked to guess the holistic evaluations of alternatives for their opponents, rather than the different components of their opponents' value functions.…”