Thailand: Contestation Over Elections, Sovereignty and Representation

Hewison, Kevin

doi:10.1080/00344893.2015.1011459

Cited by 15 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 13 publications

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“…Military juntas have conducted two coups – in 2006 and 2014 – each leading to a new constitution. The government after the 2006 coup was not fully controlled by the military, but the post‐2014 government is run and fully controlled by the military, representing a return to state authoritarianism (Baker ; Hewison ). Despite talking about a ‘return to democracy’, the post‐2014 military government seems to be in no hurry to foster a return to full democracy and is trying constitutionally to continue its control over a future elected government (Hewison ).…”

Section: Thai Capitalism Politics Unions and The Application Of Ilomentioning

confidence: 99%

International labour standards and decent work: a critical analysis of Thailand's experiences, with suggestions for theory, policy, practice and research

Suttawet

Bamber

2018

Asia Pac J Human Res

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The International Labour Organization (ILO) promotes labour standards and decent work to counter a global ‘race to the bottom’ in terms of job regulation. By analysing Thailand's experiences, we consider three questions: 1) How might we characterize Thai capitalism?; 2) What are Thailand's labour market contexts for human resource management and industrial relations?; and 3) What is Thailand's situation regarding decent work and how is it related to politics, ILO labour standards and labour law? We identify two Thai labour‐market contexts: state‐owned and private enterprises where there is unionization (Type A); and public services/smaller enterprises/informal work where unionization is negligible (Type B). We find implementation of decent work is patchy. We suggest that Thailand reforms its tripartite agency to promote decent work and improve human resource management. These steps are more likely to be more effective and sustained under a parliamentary democracy than under a military junta. Our analysis has relevance also for other economies.

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Section: Thai Capitalism Politics Unions and The Application Of Ilomentioning

confidence: 99%

International labour standards and decent work: a critical analysis of Thailand's experiences, with suggestions for theory, policy, practice and research

Suttawet

Bamber

2018

Asia Pac J Human Res

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“…This ongoing political contest between the "yellow-shirts" and the "red-shirts" that followed the 2006 coup has had a massive impact on Thai society. This conflict has been described by many as the deep societal division that cuts across many types of loyalties and socioeconomic backgrounds (Hewison, 2015;McCargo, 2008). The yellow-shirt movement has often been portrayed as primarily driven by the establishment of well-off urban people with royalist sentiments (Naruemon Thabchumpon and McCargo, 2011).…”

Section: Explaining the Change In The Thai Party Systemmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Many of its supporters came from the Bangkok middle classes and from the DP's strong electoral base in the south (Pye and Schaffar, 2008). Key aspects of the yellow-shirt movement's rhetoric were its anticorruption, protection of the monarchy, and a growing opposition to electoral politics (Hewison, 2015). In contrast, the red-shirt movement has been delineated as the political movement of awakening rural people, especially in the densely populated north and northeastern parts of the country, with the consciousness of inequality (Naruemon Thabchumpon and McCargo, 2011).…”

Section: Explaining the Change In The Thai Party Systemmentioning

confidence: 99%

Social divisions, party support, and the changes in the Thai party system since 2001

Huang

Thananithichot²

2018

International Area Studies Review

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This article investigates the interactions of socioeconomic characteristics and electoral outcomes at the constituency level to demonstrate the change in the Thai party system since 2001. Probing the effects of the agricultural population and income inequality on electoral outcomes in the proportional representation (PR) tier, this article finds that the Thai Rak Thai Party (TRT) and the Democrat Party (DP) attracted voters with opposite social standings. While voters residing in the provinces with substantial agrarian populations tended to vote more for the TRT than the DP, constituencies with highly unequal income distribution were more likely to be DP supporters. The findings provide evidence against alternative explanations, including regionalism and support for a charismatic leader, for the TRT’s consecutive victories. Due to the convergence between social divisions and party support, the Thai party system has become stable and strong enough to resist short-term interventions, implying that the future electoral outcomes will likely be similar.

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“…Using neo-authoritarian rhetoric, Duterte threatened to disband Congress, tame the courts, and ignore human rights advocates if they stood in his way, showing that he had radicalized Aquino's reformism, jettisoning its liberal aspects, instead promising quick results through harsh punitive measures (Teehankee and Thompson 2016). So while in the Philippines elite 'reformists' and middle class-backed 'neo-authoritarians' could win power through elections, in Thailand the electorally powerless elite opposition to Thaksin had to rely on the military to retain power, most recently through the May 2014 coup (Hewison 2015, Kitti 2015, Nelson 2015, Pavin 2014b.…”

Section: Nationalizing the Moral Economy Of Electoralismmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Moral Economy of Electoralism and the Rise of Populism in the Philippines and Thailand

Thompson

2016

Journal of Developing Societies

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In the Philippines and Thailand, two radically different “tales of democracy” are told: an elitist national narrative critiquing electoral “corruption” epitomized by vote buying and a local interpretation of elections in which politicians are judged according to the extent to which they benefit voters’ community and affirm poor people’s self-worth. The disadvantaged population’s community-based, mutualist voting behavior can be understood as a “moral economy of electoralism.” With the rise of populism under Joseph E. Estrada in the Philippines and Thaksin Shinawatra in Thailand, this electoral moral economy, previously hidden at the local level, appeared “center stage” in both countries, directly challenging elites. Under the guise of corruption charges, both Estrada in the Philippines and Thaksin in Thailand were overthrown despite continued strong support from less well-off voters. With the relative success of an elite “reformist” president in the Philippines, Benigno S. Aquino III, the populist “threat” has receded in the Philippines (although a neo-authoritarian challenge looms). But Thaksin’s electoral invulnerability led elites to back military rule aiming to postpone elections until their impact has been enervated through constitutional “reforms,” showing how strong the now nationalized moral economy of electoralism has become in Thailand.

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Thailand: Contestation Over Elections, Sovereignty and Representation

Cited by 15 publications

References 13 publications

International labour standards and decent work: a critical analysis of Thailand's experiences, with suggestions for theory, policy, practice and research

International labour standards and decent work: a critical analysis of Thailand's experiences, with suggestions for theory, policy, practice and research

Social divisions, party support, and the changes in the Thai party system since 2001

The Moral Economy of Electoralism and the Rise of Populism in the Philippines and Thailand

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