The Moral Economy of Electoralism and the Rise of Populism in the Philippines and Thailand

Abstract

In the Philippines and Thailand, two radically different “tales of democracy” are told: an elitist national narrative critiquing electoral “corruption” epitomized by vote buying and a local interpretation of elections in which politicians are judged according to the extent to which they benefit voters’ community and affirm poor people’s self-worth. The disadvantaged population’s community-based, mutualist voting behavior can be understood as a “moral economy of electoralism.” With the rise of populism under Joseph E. Estrada in the Philippines and Thaksin Shinawatra in Thailand, this electoral moral economy, previously hidden at the local level, appeared “center stage” in both countries, directly challenging elites. Under the guise of corruption charges, both Estrada in the Philippines and Thaksin in Thailand were overthrown despite continued strong support from less well-off voters. With the relative success of an elite “reformist” president in the Philippines, Benigno S. Aquino III, the populist “threat” has receded in the Philippines (although a neo-authoritarian challenge looms). But Thaksin’s electoral invulnerability led elites to back military rule aiming to postpone elections until their impact has been enervated through constitutional “reforms,” showing how strong the now nationalized moral economy of electoralism has become in Thailand.

Social Inequalities and the Politicization of Ethnic Cleavages in Botswana, Ghana, Nigeria, and Senegal, 1999–2019

“…In that sense, patronage plays an important role in structuring cleavages, as in the cases of Thailand and the Philippines described by Mark Thompson (Thompson 2016). The upper classes tend to denounce patronage and denigrate the behaviors of the poor, perceived as ignoring the common good of the nation as they focus on their immediate personal interests.…”

The political economy of social protection adoption

“…While weak institutionalization in the provision of social transfers can indeed facilitate clientelistic forms of pro-poor redistribution and offer a double-dividend to political elites because of the reasons discussed in Section , we cannot entirely rule out the possibility of opportunistic regimes in more competitive democratic systems enjoying an incumbency advantage via tactical redistribution, as has been reported from Latin America (De La O 2013;Filipovich et al 2018;Lazar 2004;Luccisano and Macdonald 2012) and Asia (Curato 2017;Hadiz 2016;Jaffrelot and Tillin 2017;Thompson 2016;Wyatt 2013), where large social trans-…”

Populism and Muslim democracies

“…In Southeast Asia, the Philippines under Joseph Estrada and Thailand under Thaksin Shinawatra are obvious examples of anti‐elite populists where the leaders won support from the poor through a redistributive bargain (Hewison, 2005; Thompson, 2016). Hewison (2017) further argued that Thaksin Shinawatra was initially not a populist but was made one due to the political circumstances of his time such as the military coup in 2006 and the red shirt mass movement that followed which receives the support of the rural and working class population.…”