Testing for market power using a dynamic oligopoly model

Steen, Frode; Salvanes, Kjell G.

doi:10.1016/s0167-7187(97)00025-8

Cited by 97 publications

(77 citation statements)

References 30 publications

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“…Within this model she then can qualify and quantify firms' strategic behavior with respect to pricing and advertising. In contrast to these papers Steen and Salvanes (1999) proposed a dynamic oligopoly model in an error correcting framework. Using data from the French market for fresh salmon they separated the long-run effects from the short-run effects.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Testing dynamic oligopolistic interaction: evidence from the semiconductor industry

Zulehner

2003

International Journal of Industrial Organization

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The objective of this paper is to test whether firms in the Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) industry take the intertemporal strategic effect of their contemporaneous output decision on their rivals' future output decision into account or whether they precommit themselves to a production plan.Learning-by-doing and spillovers are present in this industry and introduce an intertemporal component to firms' strategies. A simplified version of Jarmin (1994)'s dynamic oligopolistic model is applied to firm-level data. Demand and pricing relations for five DRAM generations are estimated. The empirical results show that firms behave strategically and price-cost margins are likely overestimated in a precommitment specification.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Testing dynamic oligopolistic interaction: evidence from the semiconductor industry

Zulehner

2003

International Journal of Industrial Organization

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“…We will not elaborate further on this issue here, but only note that the models can be used with aggregate data to test whether groups of firms have market power if one is willing to assume that an aggregation criterion holds or to make interpretations based directly on the aggregated data. Several studies (e.g., Steen and Salvanes (1999)) have also raised the possibility that a firm or an industry can have market power in the short run, but not in the long run. This issue is also certainly relevant in an oligopsony setting, as for instance in the hold-up problem in relation to asset specificity (Klein, Crawford and Alchian, 1978).…”

Section: Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This issue is also certainly relevant in an oligopsony setting, as for instance in the hold-up problem in relation to asset specificity (Klein, Crawford and Alchian, 1978). A similar approach to Steen and Salvanes (1999), where lagged values of the variables are included on the right-hand side, can be used to investigate such a hypothesis.…”

Section: Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Buying Power in Uk Retail Chains: A Residual Supply Approach

Asche

Tveterås

2011

Aquaculture Economics & Management

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© Dette eksemplar er fremstilt etter avtale med KOPINOR, Stenergate 1, 0050 Oslo. Ytterligere eksemplarfremstilling uten avtale og i strid med åndsverkloven er straffbart og kan medføre erstatningsansvar. iii Abstract The development of supermarket chains has led to substantial concentration in food supply chains, and has raised concerns not only that these companies can exploit oligopoly power, but also oligopsony power. In this paper, we specify a residual supply schedule to investigate the degree of oligopsony power in retailing. Based on the residual supply elasticity, one can also derive a Lerner-type index to measure the degree of market power. After examining the largest supermarket chains in the United Kingdom, we find no evidence of monopsony power for three key seafood products.

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“…Analogously, if this parameter tends to one, we have a monopoly or a perfect cartel. If the parameter is located in the interval between zero and one the market can be represented by some oligopolistic structure (Steen and Salvanes, 1999).…”

Section: The Theoretical Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Estimating a theoretical model of state banking competition using a dynamic panel: the Brazilian case

Sanches¹,

Rocha²,

Silva

2009

Rev. Bras. Econ.

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In this paper we set up a model of regional banking competition based on Bresnahan (1982), Lau (1982) and Nakane (2002). The structural model is estimated using data from eight Brazilian states and a dynamic panel. The results show that on average the level of competition in the Brazilian banking system is high, even tough the null of perfect competition can be rejected at the usual significance levels. This result also prevails at the state level: Rio Grande do Sul, São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Pernambuco and Minas Gerais have high degree of competition.
O presente artigo propõe um modelo regional de competição bancária baseado nas contribuições de Bresnahan (1982), Lau (1982) e Nakane (2002). O modelo estrutural formuladoé estimado utilizando as informações para oito estados brasileiros e um painel dinâmico. Os resultados mostram que, na média, o nível de competição no sistema bancário brasileiro é alto, embora a hipótese nula de competição perfeita possa ser rejeitada aos níveis usuais de significância. De uma forma geral, este padrão também prevalece nos estados: Rio Grande do Sul, São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Pernambuco e Minas Gerais têm elevado grau de competição

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Testing for market power using a dynamic oligopoly model

Cited by 97 publications

References 30 publications

Testing dynamic oligopolistic interaction: evidence from the semiconductor industry

Testing dynamic oligopolistic interaction: evidence from the semiconductor industry

Buying Power in Uk Retail Chains: A Residual Supply Approach

Estimating a theoretical model of state banking competition using a dynamic panel: the Brazilian case

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