Terrorist Learning: A Look at the Adoption of Political Kidnappings in Six Countries, 1968–1990

Abstract

This article studies the epidemic of kidnappings across six countries between 1968 and 1990. The goal is to identify those factors that determine the operational decisions made by terrorists. Why and how do terrorists decide to engage in certain types of actions but not others? The article discusses a number of scholarly approaches, and the variables these studies have put forward to explain the decisionmaking processes within terrorist organizations. The argument made here is that the groups' ideological preferences, strategic analysis, and need to attract media attention did not appear to exert much influence in the terrorists' decision to kidnap. Organizational resources and the nature of the security environment in which the terrorists operated had some bearing. However, kidnappings became attractive when terrorists made a pragmatic evaluation of the reaction by governments and the public and consequently of the costs or benefits of a particular course of action. The decision to carry out a campaign of kidnappings, or to abstain from kidnapping, should be interpreted as clear evidence of terrorist learning. Two types of learning appear to have influenced the adoption of kidnappings: learning by observing others and learning by doing.In December 1973, the Basque Euskadi ta Askatasuna (Basque Homeland and Liberty, or ETA) assassinated the Spanish prime minister, Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco. This was a spectacular feat that eliminated any possibility of a continuation of Francoism after General Francisco Franco's death, greatly eased the advent of democracy, and therefore colored the Spaniards' views on ETA for a decade. ETA was quite candid in its book-length account of this operation:ETA was given a secret news report that in Madrid Luis Carrero Blanco went to mass every morning at 9 in a Jesuit church on Serrano Street … it appeared that there wasn't much guarding of Carrero. It might even be possible to kidnap him. That's the real way the idea of kidnapping Carrero came about. It would have been more logical for us to have planned to kidnap Carrero and then find the means of doing it. But life is always a little topsy-turvy, and in this case, we did it backwards. 1 Without that tip on Carrero's church attendance, which ETA obtained by chance, the operation might not have been conceived. Surveillance convinced ETA that the kidnapping CONTACT Maria Rasmussen

Beyond Ransom and Political Concessions? Explaining Changes in Insurgents’ Kidnapping Involvement Versus Event-frequency

“…Holding territories is a condition repeatedly identified in the existing literature that can make kidnappings easier and less risky in multiple ways (Asal et al 2019;Elster 2004;Rasmussen 2017). Controlling territory allows insurgents to easily access and scout for potential targets, increasing the structural opportunities to engage in kidnappings.…”

“…Empirical evidence on why insurgents commit kidnappings is sparse. A handful of studies have examined factors related to the distribution and frequency of kidnappings across countries and perpetrating groups (Asal et al 2019; Forest 2012b; Gilbert 2020; Pires et al 2017; Rasmussen 2017). They found that kidnappings tend to happen in weaker and less stable states (Pires et al 2017; Rasmussen 2017) and are committed by more resourceful groups with a larger membership size, holding territories, and with more criminal connections (Asal et al 2021; Forest 2012b).…”

“…A handful of studies have examined factors related to the distribution and frequency of kidnappings across countries and perpetrating groups (Asal et al 2019; Forest 2012b; Gilbert 2020; Pires et al 2017; Rasmussen 2017). They found that kidnappings tend to happen in weaker and less stable states (Pires et al 2017; Rasmussen 2017) and are committed by more resourceful groups with a larger membership size, holding territories, and with more criminal connections (Asal et al 2021; Forest 2012b). These results highlighted the impact of organizational capacity and resource on kidnapping decisions, directly supporting the first strand of theoretical explanation that insurgents engage in kidnappings when it is easier to accomplish.…”

“…Insurgent groups like Al Shabaab had kidnapped local residents for “wearing trousers extending beyond the ankles and for having foreign hairstyles,” consuming or dealing drugs, playing football, watching “indiscipline films and pornographic videos on their cell phones,” or refusing to comply with orders generally. 3 Studies have also likened the use of kidnappings to states’ “arresting” power, the setup of “people’s trials” and de-facto imprisonment (Kachynova 2015; Rasmussen 2017). As such, changes in insurgents' involvement in public service provision may influence their strategic need to use kidnappings for social control.…”

What drives terrorist innovation? Lessons from Black September and Munich 1972

“…A growing body of research has attempted to identify and understand the factors associated with innovation in terrorism (e.g. Dolnik, 2007;Rasmussen and Hafez, 2010;Horowitz, 2010;Jackson and Loidolt, 2013;Gill, 2017;Rasmussen, 2017). In part this increased attention reflects a concern that more innovative terrorist campaigns might potentially be more successful and/or simply more dangerous.…”