Ten Testable Properties of Consciousness

Tyler, Christopher W.

doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2020.01144

Cited by 5 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 43 publications

(63 reference statements)

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“…Certainly the idea of a percept without neuronal support will provoke objections, all the more so since there is a strong intuitive feeling that perception (as defined in “Terminology and Definitions”) behaves like a physical signal, and that “to perceive” is the main purpose of the visual system rather than the guidance of behavioural acts. From these feelings arise assumptions that contradict the present proposals: Tyler ( 2020 ), for instance, assumes that “the neural substrate for conscious processing […] must have a spatiotemporal isomorphism with the experiential properties of consciousness.” McLelland et al ( 2010 ) state: “it is generally hypothesised that driven responses underlie the perception of actual visual stimuli” (“driven” in this context means due to actual optical stimulation, as opposed to afterimages). When perception over extended time spans is taken into consideration, a succession of neuronal activity is assumed to occur in parallel (Melloni, 2015 ).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 81%

Inattentive Perception, Time, and the Incomprehensibility of Consciousness

Krüger¹

2022

Front. Psychol.

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Cerebral energy supply is insufficient to support continuous neuronal processing of the plethora of time-constant objects that we are aware of. As a result, the brain is forced to limit processing resources to (the most relevant) cases of change. The neuronally generated world is thus temporally discontinuous. This parallels the fact that, in all relevant microscopic fundamental equations of nature, temporal change plays a dominant role. When a scientist calculates a “solution” to such an equation, integration over time is an essential step. The present Hypothesis expresses that the step from neuronal activity to phenomenal content of consciousness is reflective of a (phenomenal) “solution:” the main source of the incomprehensibility of consciousness is proposed to result from the introduction of phenomenal time-constant entities. These are “filled-in” via integration, even though neuronal data only exists for changes to these entities. In this way, a temporally continuous picture of the world phenomenally appears. Qualia are “initial conditions,” which are required for integration and cannot be deduced from present data. Phenomenal “identity” (vs. “high similarity”) is related to qualia. Inattentive visual perception, which is only rarely investigated, offers insights into these relationships. Introspectively, unattended vision appears rich because percepts are cumulated over long time spans, whereas attentive perception relies purely on present neuronal signals. The present Hypothesis is that a brief neuronal activity can signify long-lasting and constant phenomenal content of consciousness. Experimental support is presented that comes from discrepancies between neuronal activity and perception: transient neuronal responses to sustained stimuli, “filling-in,” change blindness, identity vs. close resemblance.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 81%

Inattentive Perception, Time, and the Incomprehensibility of Consciousness

Krüger¹

2022

Front. Psychol.

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Perspectivas del estudio de la consciencia: aproximación desde las ciencias de la complejidad y la biología evolutiva

Martínez García

2024

Entreciencias

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Objetivo: presentar los avances y problemas vigentes del estudio de la consciencia con el fin de discutir las ventajas de un programa de investigación centrado en ella, definido por la biología evolutiva y las ciencias de la complejidad.Diseño metodológico: se realizó una revisión de la literatura científica de los estudios de la consciencia. La revisión se centró en mostrar los hallazgos y limitaciones conceptuales y metodológicas. Posterior a eso, se realizó un análisis de los métodos de las ciencias de la complejidad y la biología evolutiva para discutir sus alcances en el estudio de la consciencia.Resultados: se presenta el desarrollo comparativo de diferentes teorías actuales sobre la consciencia, entre ellas: la Teoría de la integración de la información y la Teoría del área de trabajo global. También se presenta un esquema de trabajo con los métodos de las ciencias de la complejidad y se sugiere a la biología evolutiva como un marco para la interpretación de los resultados.Limitaciones de la investigación: la falta de consenso en la definición dificulta la integración de los datos empíricos en una teoría general de la consciencia.Hallazgos: se argumenta a favor de seis puntos necesarios para el programa de investigación de la biología evolutiva y de la complejidad. Los puntos son: el análisis funcional adaptativo de la consciencia, la emergencia de estructuras modulares, las novedades evolutivas, la correspondencia genética de las capacidades cognitivas, el efecto del medio y la causalidad recíproca.

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Approaching the nature of consciousness through a phenomenal analysis of early vision. What is the explanandum?

Forti

2024

Front. Psychol.

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Loorits (2014) identifies the solution to the hard problem of consciousness in the possibility of fully analyzing seemingly non-structural aspects of consciousness in structural terms. However, research on consciousness conducted in recent decades has failed to bridge the explanatory gap between the brain and conscious mind. One reason why the explanatory gap cannot be filled, and consequently the problem remains hard, is that experience and neural structure are too different or “distant” to be directly compatible. Conversely, structural aspects of consciousness can be found in phenomenal experience. One possible alternative, therefore, is to seek the structure of seemingly non-structural aspects of consciousness not in the neural substrate, but within consciousness itself, through a phenomenal analysis of the qualitative aspects of experience, starting from its simplest forms. An essential premise is to reformulate the explanandum of consciousness, which is usually attributed to qualia and what it is like to be in a certain state. However, these properties do not allow us to identify the fundamental aspects of phenomenal experience. Sensations such as the redness of red or the painfulness of pain are inseparable from the context of the experience to which they belong, making qualia appear as phenomenal artifacts. Furthermore, the simplest qualitative aspects can be found in early vision. They are involved in perceptual organization and necessarily have relational significance. The unitary set of qualities found in early vision—such as those related to being an object, background or detail—constitutes the explanandum of the simplest forms of consciousness and seems to imply a justifying structure. Although early vision is characterized by interdependent qualitative components that form a unitary whole, we cannot find in it the structure of seemingly non-structural aspects of consciousness. Phenomenal appearance alone does not seem sufficient to identify a unitary structure of consciousness. However, the closeness of these characteristics to a unitary structure prompts us to delve into less explored territory, using the components of experience also as possible explanans.

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Ten Testable Properties of Consciousness

Cited by 5 publications

References 43 publications

Inattentive Perception, Time, and the Incomprehensibility of Consciousness

Inattentive Perception, Time, and the Incomprehensibility of Consciousness

Perspectivas del estudio de la consciencia: aproximación desde las ciencias de la complejidad y la biología evolutiva

Approaching the nature of consciousness through a phenomenal analysis of early vision. What is the explanandum?

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