Temporal Parts Unmotivated

Rea, Michael C.

doi:10.2307/2998484

Cited by 71 publications

(28 citation statements)

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“…Agreed, we cannot in general expect to reconstruct the temporal order of a set of configurations. 13 But there is no strong reason to require that we pose the question 'was the same particle chosen?' without information about the times of configurations.…”

Section: Examplesmentioning

confidence: 99%

On the Persistence of Particles

Butterfield¹

2005

Found Phys

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This paper is about the metaphysical debate whether objects persist over time by the selfsame object existing at different times (nowadays called `endurance' by metaphysicians), or by different temporal parts, or stages, existing at different times (called ` perdurance'). I aim to illuminate the debate by using some elementary kinematics and real analysis: resources which metaphysicians have, surprisingly, not availed themselves of. There are two main results, which are of interest to both endurantists and perdurantists. (1): I describe a precise formal equivalence between the way that the two metaphysical positions represent the motion of the objects of classical mechanics (both point-particles and continua). (2): I make precise, and prove a result about, the idea that the persistence of objects moving in a void is to be analysed in terms of tracking the continuous curves in spacetime that connect points occupied by matter. The result is entirely elementary: it is a corollary of the Heine-Borel theorem.Comment: 31 pages Latex, no figures. Dedicated to the memory of James T. Cushing. Forthcoming in Foundations of Physic

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Section: Examplesmentioning

confidence: 99%

On the Persistence of Particles

Butterfield¹

2005

Found Phys

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“…And according to Absolutism, this is the only fundamental parthood relation. 12 Many have argued that the fundamental parthood relation for material objects is a three-place relation expressed by 'x is a part of y at z', with two slots for material objects and one slot for a time (Thomson 1983, van Inwagen 1990, Koslicki 2008 or a region of space or spacetime (Rea 1998, Hudson 2001, McDaniel 2004, Donnelly 2010 (Sider 2001). But without temporal parts or a privileged present, the most natural option is to hold that the fundamental parthood relation holding between material objects is a more-than-twoplace relation.…”

Section: Second Compromise: the Many-slice Constitution Viewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Building Enduring Objects Out of Spacetime

Gilmore

2014

Synthese Library

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, eds., Mereology and the Sciences (volume under review at Springer, Synthese Library) Cody Gilmore Endurantism, the view that material objects are wholly present at each moment of their careers, is under threat from supersubstantivalism, the view that material objects are identical to spacetime regions. I discuss three compromise positions. They are alike in that they all take material objects to be composed of spacetime points or regions without being identical to any such point or region. They differ in whether they permit multilocation and in whether they generate cases of mereologically coincident entities. IntroductionLet me start with a rough characterization of two main views about persistence:Endurantism: At least some material objects persist through time; and every material object is temporally unextended and wholly present at each instant at which it exists at all. Moreover, it is not the case that every material object has a different instantaneous temporal part 1 at each different instant at which it exists.Perdurantism: At least some material objects persist through time; any every material object has a different instantaneous temporal part at each different instant at which it exists. Material objects that do persist are temporally extended and are at most partially present (not wholly present) at any one instant.I will introduce more carefully formulated views later on (from Gilmore 2006), but these are adequate for present purposes. Endurantism fits comfortably with presentism and certain other A-theorist of time.2 It also fits together fairly well with a certain brand of B-theoretic eternalism. What I have in mind here is a view like Newton's, according to which substantival space and substantival time are two separate and fundamental entities, and spacetime, if there is such a thing at all, is merely a construct of some sort. (Perhaps spacetime points are identified with ordered pairs.) Call this view about space and time 'separatist substantivalism'; it should be understood as incorporating eternalism and the B-theory. 1 The standard definition of 'instantaneous temporal part' runs as follows: 'x is an instantaneous temporal part of y at t' means '(i) t is an instant, (ii) x is a part of y at t, (iii) x overlaps-at-t every part-at-t of y, (iii) x is present at t, and (iv) x is not present at any other instant'. (This is based on Sider (2001: 59).) For other definitions, see Gibson and Pooley (2006: 163), Parsons (2007), and Balashov (2010: 73). The key point is that, in order for a thing y to count as a temporal part of a thing x, y must be a part of x and y must be spatially co-located with x at any moment at which y is present. 2 A-theories of time all say that there is a time that is present in some absolute, not-merely-indexical sense. That is, they say that there is a 'metaphysically privileged' present time. The B-theory of time denies this. Presentism is an A-theory of time according to which there are no non-present entities (such as, presumably, p...

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“…3 For papers connecting the persistence debate with presentism and eternalism, see Merricks (1995and 1999), and Rea (1998 5 ambiguous between tensed and tenseless existence. In temporal contexts one can always raise the question whether "exist" is meant in the tensed or in the tenseless sense of existence, so To understand why this conclusion follows, assume per absurdum that endurantism be compatible with eternalism (END & ETER) and consider two "things" at a certain time, for instance, "me at the present moment", or "the Mount Everest at the present moment".…”

Section: How To Prove That Endurantism Entails Presentismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Presentism/Eternalism and Endurantism/Perdurantism: why the Unsubstantiality of the first debate implies that of the second

Dorato¹

2012

Philosoph Natur

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The main claim that I want to defend in this paper is that the there are logical equivalences between eternalism and perdurantism on the one hand and presentism and endurantism on the other. By "logical equivalence" I mean that one position is entailed and entails the other. As a consequence of this equivalence, it becomes important to inquire into the question whether the dispute between endurantists and perdurantists is authentic, given that Savitt (2006) Dolev (2006) and have cast doubts on the fact that the debate between presentism and eternalism is about "what there is". In this respect, I will conclude that also the debate about persistence in time has no ontological consequences, in the sense that there is no real ontological disagreement between the two allegedly opposite positions: as in the case of the presentism/eternalism debate, one can be both a perdurantist and an endurantist, depending on which linguistic framework is preferred.The main claim that I want to defend in this paper is that the there are logical equivalences between eternalism and perdurantism on the one hand and presentism and endurantism on the other. By "logical equivalence" I mean that one position is entailed and entails the other. As a consequence of this equivalence, it becomes important to inquire into the question whether the dispute between endurantists and perdurantists is authentic, given that Savitt (2006) Dolev (2006) and have cast doubts on the fact that the debate between presentism and eternalism is about "what there is". In this respect, I will conclude that also the debate about persistence in time has no ontological consequences, in the sense that there is no real ontological disagreement between the two allegedly opposite positions: as 1 My thanks to Florian Fischer, Cord Friebe, Thomas Müller and Thorben Petersen for their valuable comments and criticism concerning a previous version of this paper. All remaining errors are my responsibility.2 in the case of the presentism/eternalism debate, one can be both a perdurantist and an endurantist, depending on which linguistic framework is preferred.More in detail, I will defend the following equivalence: in the case of the presentism/eternalism debate, present-tense expressions have the aim of expressing the temporal position of the speaker vis à vis the events one is referring to; but in other circumstances, by using a tenseless copula, one is taking a sort of an non-perspectival, viewfrom-nowhere outlook vis à vis past, present and future events, by declaring them to be all tenselessly coexistent. Both uses of the copula (tensed and tenseless) are consistent and important, so that there is no reason to transform the choice of a language into a philosophical dispute about what there is. Analogous conclusion will be show to hold for the endurantist/perdurantism dispute.In particular, in section 1 of the paper I will defend the above mentioned equivalence, while in section 2 I will show in what sense, in virtue of the equivalence, one could argue that if pres...

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Temporal Parts Unmotivated

Cited by 71 publications

References 18 publications

On the Persistence of Particles

On the Persistence of Particles

Building Enduring Objects Out of Spacetime

Presentism/Eternalism and Endurantism/Perdurantism: why the Unsubstantiality of the first debate implies that of the second

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