Technological Change and Welfare in the Regulated Industries

Capron, William M.

doi:10.1080/00346767100000001

Cited by 6 publications

(8 citation statements)

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“…It flies in the face of the usual expectations about the effects of regulation on managerial behavior. Regulation, for example, is known to increase bureaucratic costs (Russo, 1992), distort input mix choices (Averch and Johnson, 1962), and blunt the stimulus to innovate (Capron, 1971). It is believed to limit the incentives of firms to operate efficiently (Peteraf, 1993b;Kole and Lehn, 1997).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Managerial discretion and internal alignment under regulatory constraints and change

Peteraf

Reed

2007

Strategic Management Journal

156

142

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This paper investigates the effects of regulatory constraints and their relaxation on managerial discretion and internal fit in the context of the U.S. airline industry. Our results suggest that when managers' discretion is limited in one realm of choice, they compensate by using their greater level of discretion in some other arena to achieve internal fit. We show that the pursuit of fit matters, in the sense of having measurable efficiency consequences, and that fit trumps 'best practice,' at least in this context. In this respect, our findings provide a validation of the contingency perspective on internal fit. The ability to achieve fit under changing conditions may express a dynamic managerial capability necessary for adaptive organizational change.Contingency theory, despite its influence within organizational theory as well as the strategy field, is more properly characterized as a perspective than a well-specified theory per se (Schoonhoven,

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Managerial discretion and internal alignment under regulatory constraints and change

Peteraf

Reed

2007

Strategic Management Journal

156

142

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“…In the early 1970s, the Brookings Institution sponsored a series of studies on innovation that dealt with economic regulation, or as Brookings defined it, the regulation of competition [Capron, 1971]. These studies examined the effect on innovation of regulating industry structure, prices, and competitive practices.…”

Section: Different Policies Different Effectsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…But the Brookings studies introduced a significant caveat "that only in a few exceptional instances" can the inadequacy of performance be dearly documented. Evidence on how a firm or industry could be more innovative if unhampered by regulation was hard to come by, for there were few cases of no regulation or alternative forms of regulation to compare with existing practice in the case of the regulated industry [Capron, 1971]. When scholars hold that regulation stimulates or retards innovation, they have not resolved with consistency what standard should be used in judging industry performance.…”

Section: Different Policies Different Effectsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Policy Uncertainty and Technological Innovation^,

Marcus

1981

AMR

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Without certainty about government policies, business decision makers are unable to assess risk and opportunity and make the trade-offs necessary for investment in new technologies. Different policies (R&D, health and safety, economic regulation) have different effects, depending on type of industry and size of firm. Because there are no established standards for judging industry performance, it is difficult to know whether policy uncertainty is simply a rationalization for not innovating or whether there is a causeand-effect relationship between policy uncertainty and technological change.

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“…Capital is not a regressive factor if F K F LL -F L F LK 0, which is equivalent to (18). The argument presented here follows McNicol (60), which is in the same vein as the arguments presented in Westfield (92) and .…”

Section: Define Ifmentioning

confidence: 76%

Theoretical Models of Rate Regulation: A Survey and Critique

McNicol

Phillips

1978

Studies in Economics and Finance

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INTRODUCTION During the past dozen years a relatively large theoretical literature has grown out of the models proposed by Averch‐Johnson (2) and, to a lesser extent, Wellisz (90). Averch‐Johnson (here‐after A‐J) pointed out the now famous overcapitalization effect‐that a monopoly subject to rate of return regulation has an incentive to use more than the cost minimizing value of capital. The A‐J model was at first regarded as simply a theoretical explanation of what was long thought to be a significant cost of regulation. After languishing in this state for several years, the model achieved some popularity as a vehicle for theoretical explorations of various aspects of rate regulation. To date, the A‐J model has given rise to nearly forty papers on what has come to be called “the theory of regulatory constraint.”

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Technological Change and Welfare in the Regulated Industries

Cited by 6 publications

References 0 publications

Managerial discretion and internal alignment under regulatory constraints and change

Managerial discretion and internal alignment under regulatory constraints and change

Policy Uncertainty and Technological Innovation^,

Theoretical Models of Rate Regulation: A Survey and Critique

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Technological Change and Welfare in the Regulated Industries

Cited by 6 publications

References 0 publications

Managerial discretion and internal alignment under regulatory constraints and change

Managerial discretion and internal alignment under regulatory constraints and change

Policy Uncertainty and Technological Innovation,

Theoretical Models of Rate Regulation: A Survey and Critique

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Policy Uncertainty and Technological Innovation^,