Team production benefits from a permanent fear of exclusion

Kopányi-Peuker, Anita; Offerman, Theo; Sloof, Randolph

doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2018.01.005

Cited by 11 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 38 publications

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“…Kopányi-Peuker et al (2018) study the effects of an exclusion institution in a weakest-link game Croson et al (2015). show that an automatic exclusion institution that always excludes the lowest contributor leads to very high cooperation levels.…”

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confidence: 99%

Voting on the threat of exclusion in a public goods experiment

2019

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Ostracism is practiced by virtually all societies around the world as a means of enforcing cooperation. In this paper, we use a public goods experiment to study whether groups choose to implement an institution that allows for the exclusion of members. We distinguish between a costless exclusion institution and a costly exclusion institution that, if chosen, reduces the endowment of all players. We also provide a comparison with an exclusion institution that is exogenously imposed upon groups. A significant share of the experimental groups choose the exclusion institution, even when it comes at a cost, and the support for the institution increases over time. Average contributions to the public good are significantly higher when the exclusion option is available, not only because low contributors are excluded but also because high contributors sustain a higher cooperation level under the exclusion institution. Subjects who vote in favor of the exclusion institution contribute more than those who vote against it, but only when the institution is implemented. These results are largely inconsistent with standard economic theory but can be better explained by assuming heterogeneous groups in which some players have selfish and others have social preferences.

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confidence: 99%

Voting on the threat of exclusion in a public goods experiment

2019

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“…The previous literature has considered various exclusion mechanisms in different environments, in particular in principal‐agent games when people can be fired or in gift‐exchange games (e.g., Bernard, Fanning, and Yuksel ; Berninghaus, Bleich, and Güth ; Brown, Falk, and Fehr ; Charness, Cobo‐Reyes, and Jiménez ; Falk, Huffman, and Macleod ), in coordination games and bargaining games (Fischer and Güth ). For example, Kopanyi‐Peuker, Offerman, and Sloof () study a weak‐link game with noisy information in which a principal can replace some members of a team. The fear of being fired increases cooperation even when workers are imperfectly monitored; but to be effective, the threat has to be maintained permanently.…”

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confidence: 99%

Exclusion and Reintegration in a Social Dilemma

Soldà

Villeval

2018

Economic Inquiry

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Using a social dilemma game, we study the cooperative behavior of individuals who reintegrate their group after being excluded by their peers. We manipulate the length of exclusion and whether this length is imposed exogenously or results from a vote. We show that people are willing to exclude the least cooperators and they punish more, and more severely, chronic defections. In return, a longer exclusion has a higher disciplining effect on cooperation after reintegration, but only when the length of exclusion is not chosen by group members. Its relative disciplining effect on cooperation after reintegration is smaller when the length of exclusion results from a vote. In this environment, a quicker reintegration also limits retaliation. The difference in the impact of long versus short exclusion on retaliation is larger when the length of exclusion is chosen by group members than when it is exogenous. Post‐reintegration cooperation and forgiveness depend not only on the length of exclusion but also on the perceived intentions of others when they punish. (JEL C92, H41, D23)

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“…Whereas, Croson et al (2015) simply excluded the lowest contributor in each group after each period. More recently Kopányi-Peuker et al (2018) varied the periods for which one could be excluded. In all instances the threat of exclusion appeared to have a prevailing positive impact on cooperation regardless of the length of exclusion, or how the individual facing exclusion was determined.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Two strikes and you are out! An experiment on exclusion

Lévy

2019

Economics Letters

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Team production benefits from a permanent fear of exclusion

Cited by 11 publications

References 38 publications

Voting on the threat of exclusion in a public goods experiment

Voting on the threat of exclusion in a public goods experiment

Exclusion and Reintegration in a Social Dilemma

Two strikes and you are out! An experiment on exclusion

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