“…The previous literature has considered various exclusion mechanisms in different environments, in particular in principal‐agent games when people can be fired or in gift‐exchange games (e.g., Bernard, Fanning, and Yuksel ; Berninghaus, Bleich, and Güth ; Brown, Falk, and Fehr ; Charness, Cobo‐Reyes, and Jiménez ; Falk, Huffman, and Macleod ), in coordination games and bargaining games (Fischer and Güth ). For example, Kopanyi‐Peuker, Offerman, and Sloof () study a weak‐link game with noisy information in which a principal can replace some members of a team. The fear of being fired increases cooperation even when workers are imperfectly monitored; but to be effective, the threat has to be maintained permanently.…”